

# **POLI 120N: Contention and Conflict in Africa**

## **Professor Adida**

**Kenya & Solutions to Electoral Violence**



# *Le foot dans le sang*

*'Football is in  
your blood'*

AAASRC Presents:


## **Creating Spaces: Women's Football in Africa and the Indian Ocean**

A lecture by Dr. Martha Saavedra  
February 11, 2016 / 3:30 to 5:00 / Social Science Building #101  
University of California, San Diego

For more information: Contact [sreynder@ucsd.edu](mailto:sreynder@ucsd.edu)

# Kenya

Authority Trends, 1963-2010: Kenya






# Some perspective

1990-2010	
Election	Deaths
Kenya 2007	1502
South Africa 1994	239
Nigeria 2007	226
Côte d'Ivoire 2000	178

SCAD

# Background: Ethnic demographics

- ▶ 40 million people
- ▶ >70 different ethnic groups
- ▶ Largest groups
  - Kikuyu: 22%
  - Luhya: 13-14%
  - Luo: 13-14%
  - Kalenjin: 12%
  - Kamba: 8-9%




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34%

21%




# Background

- Kenyatta (Kikuyu) 1963-1978
  - One-party authoritarian state
  - Displacement and resettlement of Kikuyus into Rift Valley
- Moi (Kalenjin) 1978-2002
  - “Nyayo” = footsteps, close to people
  - 1982 coup attempt; corruption and political violence ensued
  - 1991: multi-party elections reintroduced, but KANU remained victor amid violent elections in 1992-7
- The 2002 surprise:
  - All opposition parties first time united in the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) and behind a single presidential candidate, Kibaki
  - Free, fair and honest elections
  - Kibaki won and for the first time, KANU not in power



# Background

- Kibaki
  - Successes: free primary education, booming tourism industry, economic growth from 0 to more than 6% annually
  - Shortcomings: corruption, widespread poverty, simmering ethnic/land tensions, failed to reform Constitution
- 2005 Referendum (YES for status quo, NO for less power in presidency)
  - Supposed to settle land rights and share political power among ethnic groups, decentralize resources across regions
  - Led to split: Odinga and Musyoka led group against approval of referendum, founded Orange Democratic Movement
  - NO side won with 58%



Kenyatta

Moi

Kibaki

# Violence unfolding

- Pre-election survey (2 weeks before election)
  - 98% intending to vote in election
  - 39.1% intended to vote for Kibaki; 46.6% for Odinga
- Actual election: December 27, 2007
  - 1 day after election, first batch of results showed Odinga with advantage (> 1 million vote margin)
  - ODM declared Odinga victory on December 29; at same time, lead had shrunk to 28k with 90% of votes counted
  - December 30: Election Commission found Kibaki the winner by 232k votes
  - Electoral observers decried fraud
- January 2, 2009: Chairman of Electoral Commission says “I do not know whether Kibaki won the election.”

# Resolution

- Violence:
  - 30% survey respondents claimed there was pre-electoral violence
  - 1 out of 2 respondents experienced attempted vote-buying
  - Bulk of violence in Nairobi and Rift Valley
- Feb. 1, ex-UN Sec Gen Kofi Annan announced that Kibaki and Odinga had agreed on an agenda for peace talks
- Handshake on Feb. 28th
  - Kibaki as President
  - Odinga as PM, a new post
- Total over 1,000 killed from Dec 1 to March 23

# Aftermath?



New York Times

**The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta**

Case Information Sheet: [English](#), [Français](#)

**Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta**

President of the Republic of Kenya

[Summonses to appear](#) issued: 8 March 2011

Initial appearance hearing: 8 April 2011

Confirmation of charges hearing: 21 September to 5 October 2011

[Decision on the confirmation of charges](#): 23 January 2012

Trial opening: vacated

[Notice of withdrawel](#) of the charges against Uhuru Mugai Kenyatta: 5 December 2014

[Decision on the withdrawal of charges against Mr Kenyatta](#): 13 March 2015

**Charges**

Mr Kenyatta was accused of the **crimes against humanity** of:

- murder (article 7(l)(a));
- deportation or forcible transfer (article 7(l)(d));
- rape (article 7(l)(g));
- persecution (articles 7(l)(h)); and
- other inhumane acts (article 7(l)(k)).

On 5 December 2014, the Prosecutor filed a notice to withdraw charges against Mr. Kenyatta.

On 13 March 2015, Trial Chamber V(B), noting the Prosecution's withdrawal of charges against Mr Kenyatta, decided to terminate the proceedings in this case and to vacate the summons to appear against him.



# Consequences

Blocked roads and rail lines



Tea and flower exports

# Consequences

	Pre-election	Post-election
Believe Kenya is full democracy	20%	6%
Prefer methods other than elections to choose leaders	10%	26%
Do not trust Electoral Commission	11%	50%
Trust President Kibaki a lot	33%	21%
Trust Parliament a lot	8%	17%

Dercon and Gutierrez-Romero 2012



# Causes

- Survey respondents asked: What triggered electoral violence in your neighborhood?
  - 42% election irregularities and a weak Electoral Commission
  - 10% tribal conflict
  - 30% did not know or refused to answer
- Targets? Five hypotheses
  - (1) People who had land disputes
  - (2) People living in areas where politically-connected gangs operated
  - (3) People living in poorer areas (grievances)
  - (4) Members of a specific ethnic group
  - (5) Ethnic diversity

# Findings

Cause	Finding
Land disputes	18-percentage point increase
Urban areas	7-percentage-point increase
Gangs	13-percentage-point increase
Wealth	None
Poor area	None
Ethnicity	None among major groups
Ethnic diversity	None

Gercon and Gutiérrez-Romero

# Take-away of Kenya case

It looked spontaneous, but it was not

- History of political corruption and electoral violence and irregularities
- Old grievances such as land disputes in the background
- Politically instigated violence by politically-linked gangs
- Role of institutional failure (Electoral Commission, police): could have been prevented

# Contrast to Kenya 2013

- Relatively no violence, in spite of close election and technical glitches
- Possible factors
  - Co-optation of possible source of violence
  - Leadership
  - Police
  - 2010 Constitutional changes
- But challenges remain

# How to reduce electoral violence: top-down


- Constitutional changes reduce the stakes of each election
- Strong and independent institutions (judiciary)
- Good leadership
- Address grievances

# How to reduce electoral violence: bottom-up

- Collier and Vicente (2008) field experiment: randomize a campaign against political violence across neighborhoods and villages of 6 states of Nigeria in 2007 election
- Campaign conducted by NGO ActionAid, specializing on community participatory development: included town meetings, popular theaters and distribution of campaign material

# How to reduce electoral violence: bottom-up

Figure 5: The Time Frame of the Experiment



- 1149 survey respondents in all treatment and control areas, interviewed before and after the campaign
- Tested a number of different outcomes
  - Respondents' experience with and perceptions of violence
  - Respondents' voting behavior
  - Actual measures of violence

Test	Result
Individual perceptions of, and attitudes toward violence?	Decrease perception of violence; increased empowerment and sense of security
Individual behavior?	Increase action against violence (postcard); Increase turnout (greater effect for local contest)
Local level vote and violence?	Reduction in intensity of violence, but not in incidence




# Bottom-up: does the anti-fraud intervention apply?

- Mobile technology reduces electoral fraud (Afghanistan, Uganda)
- Could it reduce violence?

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UCHAGUZI INCIDENT CATEGORIES, MARCH 4, 2013




A	A-	B+	B	B-	C+	C	C-	F
93-100	90-92	87-89	84-86	80-83	77-79	74-76	70-73	<70

Mean and median: 84/100

MC: 24.7/30; ID: 25/30; Essay: 33/40

Final Midterm Grade Distribution



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