


POLI 120N: Contention and Conflict in Africa
Professor Adida

Explaining civil conflict: political explanations

Map Quiz

Map Quiz Grade Distribution

- 20% of your grade
- Range: 26 - 60
- 40% got max
- Mean: 53.7 (B+)
- Median: 59 (A)
- < 42 is failing



Midterm in one week

- 30% of your grade
- Multiple Choice, IDs, Essay, Extra Credit
- Study guide is up on class site
- Closed notes, closed book
- Bring only pen, NO blue book

Midterm

- Multiple choice (30%)
- Identification terms (some choice, 30%)
- Essay (40%)

Midterm

- Know all the terms on study sheet well
- For each reading, know
 - Author's argument
 - What evidence author used to defend argument
 - Whether it agrees with, disagrees with, or ignores other arguments we have seen

ID: an example

- Trans-Atlantic slave trade

- define: one of four slave trades that occurred in Africa, from approximately 1500-1850, taking slaves from East, Central and West Africa to European colonies in the New World. It was the most intense and consequential of all slave trades for Africa. Death toll approximately 2 million. Relied on African slave dealers, who sold African POWs to Europeans in exchange for ammunition. Africans were sent to work on coffee, cocoa, cotton plantations. These goods were then sold back to Europe
- put in context: Part of the discussion on the European imprint in Africa, and discussed in Nunn reading; one of the pre-colonial factors that could explain outcomes in Africa today
- significance: Demographic consequences; Trust; Focus on coastal outposts; Introduction of ammunition and incentives to fight. All these factors ultimately affect state-building, growth and conflict in Africa. In fact, Nunn has shown that the slave trade has had detrimental effects on Africa's long-term economic development.

Explanations so far

- Ethnic diversity
- Rational response to weak state (“anarchy”)
- Economic factors

Explanations so far

- Ethnic diversity
 - difference=conflict
 - Huntington, Kaplan
 - Implicit in media accounts
- Rational response to weak state (“anarchy”)
 - no third-party + belief your group will suffer more tomorrow than if it fights today
 - Fearon, Fearon and Laitin
- Economic factors
 - greed vs. grievances
 - Huntington, Gurr, Collier and Hoeffler, Fearon and Laitin, El Badawi and Sambanis
 - special role for natural resources

Limitations

- (1) Operationalization of concepts
- (2) Causal mechanisms
- (3) Inconclusive role of ethnic diversity

Where are the politics?

Income


Natural resources

Ethnicity



?

Proportion of ethnic wars over time



Simplistic accounts of the ethnic factor


- Ethnicity explains everything
 - Ancient ethnic hatreds
 - Clash of civilizations worldview
- Ethnicity explains nothing
 - Ethnic diversity is everywhere, conflict is not everywhere
 - It's all about income

Not all civil conflicts are alike

- Different types of conflicts merit different explanations
- Variation in:
 - Types of groups mobilizing against State
 - Strength of State
 - Aims of rebels

Three levels

- Ethnicity matters because nation-states are supposed to take care of “their people”
- Inclusion/Exclusion can occur at three levels



- Territorial boundary: inside or outside the territory
- Inclusion: access to state power
- Division of power: within the in-group

Argument: boundaries matter

Source of conflict

Territorial boundary

Political inclusion

Division of power



Type of conflict

Secession

Rebellion

In-fighting

Data

- New dataset: Ethnic Power Relations
- All politically relevant ethnic groups and their degree of access to executive state 1946-2005
- Politically relevant ethnic group: at least 1 significant political actor claims to represent the interests of that group in national political arena, or if members of ethnic category are systematically and intentionally discriminated against in politics

Results

	All civil conflict	Ethnic conflict	Rebellion	Infighting	Secession
Ethnic exclusion					
Center segmentation					
History of Direct rule					

Results

	All civil conflict	Ethnic conflict	Rebellion	Infighting	Secession
Ethnic exclusion					
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History of Direct rule					

Q: True or False, according to Cederman et al. (2009), ethnic diversity in society has no significant effect on ethnic conflict.



- a. True
- b. False

Wimmer et al. (2009)

- Does income matter here?
- Do they buy into the greed/grievance debate?
- Is there a problem with their coding rule?

Wimmer et al. (2009) take-away

- Ethnicity matters
 - Not ethnic diversity in and of itself
 - But the ways in which ethnicity shapes access to the State
- Policy implications?

A puzzle emerges

- Ethnic exclusion leads to conflict
- Why would leaders exclude?
- Roessler's answer: trade-offs

Roessler's argument

- Upon independence, African leaders aim to build inclusive governments
- But including other ethnic groups creates a commitment problem
- Ethnic exclusion as a coup-proofing strategy

The trade-off




FIGURE 4
SUBSTITUTION EFFECT OF ETHNIC EXCLUSION: REBELLION RISK FOR
COUP RISK^a

^a Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Threat of a coup




FIGURE 7

PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF COUP ATTEMPTS AND COUPS
ACROSS DIFFERENT GOVERNMENT POWER HOLDERS IN AFRICA,
INDEPENDENCE TO 2005^a

Who is excluded




FIGURE 6
PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF ETHNIC EXCLUSION ACROSS DIFFERENT
GOVERNMENT POWER HOLDERS IN AFRICA, INDEPENDENCE TO 2005^a

Who then rebels




FIGURE 8

PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF GROUP REBELLION IN AFRICA,
INDEPENDENCE TO 2005^a

Conclusion

- Economic analyses help identify factors that seem to matter, but they do not tell a story of why/how they matter
- We need to do a better job at unpacking what the causal stories are
 - Different factors lead to different types of conflict outcomes
 - Leaders employ different strategies to stay in power and face trade-offs

Explanations of conflict

- Ethnic diversity
- Rational response to weak state (“anarchy”)
- Economic factors
- Political processes

Q: In Roessler (2011), the rise of the coup d'état explains the commitment problem leaders face in Africa. What is this commitment problem?



- a. Leaders can't guarantee they will help all people
- b. The US can't guarantee it will protect leaders from potential rivals
- c. Elite factions in power can't guarantee to each other that they won't conspire to usurp power
- d. Prof. Adida can't guarantee she will give everyone an A on the midterm

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Explaining civil conflict: Liberian case study

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