Trade-Offs between Equality and Difference: Immigrant Integration, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State in Cross-National Perspective

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Trade-Offs between Equality and Difference: Immigrant Integration, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State in Cross-National Perspective

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This paper investigates how integration policies and welfare-state regimes have affected the socio-economic integration of immigrants, focusing on eight European countries: Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Austria and Belgium. It presents comparative data on integration policies and welfare-state regimes. The expectations derived from this comparative policy analysis are tested with cross-national data on integration outcomes regarding labour market participation, spatial segregation and incarceration. The results suggest that multicultural policies— which grant immigrants easy access to equal rights and do not provide strong incentives for host-country language acquisition and interethnic contacts—when combined with a generous welfare state, have produced low levels of labour market participation, high levels of segregation and a strong overrepresentation of immigrants among those convicted for criminal behaviour. Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands, which have combined multicultural policies with a strong welfare state, display relatively poor integration outcomes. Countries that either had more restrictive or assimilationist integration policies (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France) or a relatively lean welfare state (the United Kingdom) have achieved better integration results. These differences are highly consistent across the three domains of integration that are examined, with the exception of segregation rates in the United Kingdom.

Keywords: Multiculturalism; Citizenship Rights; Welfare State; Socio-Economic Integration; Segregation

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Introduction

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, ‘multicultural’ policy approaches to immigrant integration have lost much of their former popularity. The Netherlands plays a crucial role in this development as the country—long regarded as an exemplary case of successful multiculturalism—is now regarded as a prime example of the failure of such policies. What, if anything, went wrong with Dutch multiculturalism and what does it teach us about immigrant integration policies more generally?

I will address these questions by comparing the Dutch case to seven other European immigration countries. I argue that easy access to equal rights, including unrestricted access to welfare state arrangements, and in combination with a large degree of facilitation of cultural differences, have had unintended negative effects on the socio-economic integration of immigrants. My analysis challenges a central assumption in the literature on multicultural rights, whereby recognition of cultural differences, the granting of special cultural rights, and protection against cultural discrimination are effective counterweights against cultural bias and exclusion in immigration societies (see, inter alia, Kymlicka 1995; Young 1990).

This assumption is contradicted by the evidence, which shows that, far from having successfully reduced socio-economic inequalities between immigrants and natives, the Netherlands is among those European countries in which immigrants are socio-economically the worst-off, in spite of the relatively far-reaching recognition and rights that they enjoy. Moreover, Sweden and Belgium, which the most resemble the Dutch combination of multicultural integration policies and a generous welfare state, display similarly unfavourable integration outcomes, compared either to Austria or Germany, which have had less inclusive integration policies, or the United Kingdom, with its relatively lean welfare state.

My analysis supports the idea that there is a ‘progressive dilemma’ (Goodhart 2004) between sustaining an inclusive welfare state with a high provision level on the one hand, and policies of multiculturalism that facilitate immigrants’ access to welfare-state arrangements on the other. My argument is not the more common one that immigration and ethnic diversity undermine support for the welfare state (see Barry 2001; Phillips 1999; and counterarguments in Banting and Kymlicka 2006). This version of the progressive dilemma thesis argues that multiculturalism is in principle good for immigrants, but that it undercuts support among the majority population for the welfare state. My argument is that, in a welfare-state context, multiculturalism may not be beneficial for immigrants at all, because it may lead to dependence on welfare-state arrangements and thereby to social and economic marginalisation.

It is important to stress that, when I speak of multiculturalism in this paper, I mean a particular type of policy approach to the management of immigration-induced cultural heterogeneity, not that heterogeneity itself. As Banting and Kymlicka (2006: 9) have argued, the term multiculturalism is often used to describe both the policy
approach and the factual increase in heterogeneity as a consequence of immigration, but it is important to keep the two distinguished, lest deficiencies of particular policies are mistaken for defects of immigration and diversity as such.

I will compare the Netherlands to the set of West European countries that have been the most important destinations of immigration since the 1950s: Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden, Austria and Belgium. I do not consider the very different contexts of European countries such as Spain, Italy and Ireland—which have only recently become important destination countries—nor Canada or the USA, because they have a much longer and very different history of immigration and more selective immigration regimes that would bias comparison with European countries.

I first show how integration policy approaches vary across the major European immigration countries. I then discuss cross-national variation regarding the inclusiveness and provision levels of the welfare state, and argue how welfare-state regimes and integration policies interact. The expectations derived from this comparative policy analysis are then tested with cross-national data on integration outcomes regarding labour market participation, spatial segregation and incarceration rates. The results suggest that multicultural policies—which do not provide strong incentives for host-country language acquisition and for interethnic contacts—when combined with an inclusive and comparatively generous welfare state, produce low levels of labour market participation, high levels of spatial segregation, and a relatively strong overrepresentation of immigrants among those involved in criminal behaviour.

Integration Policies in Comparative Perspective

Many comparative studies of citizenship and integration policies have focused on the rules for nationality acquisition (e.g. Brubaker 1992; Çinar 1994; Kleger and D’Amato 1995; Safran 1997). Nationality acquisition is a crucial determinant of migrants’ access to citizenship rights, since it entails that they become formally equal before the law. Together with Sweden and Belgium, the Netherlands has the highest naturalisation rate in Europe, whereas Germany, Switzerland and Austria have traditionally had low naturalisation rates.¹

Access to citizenship rights neither starts nor ends with the acquisition of nationality. If we consider Marshall’s (1950) three categories of rights—civic/legal, political and social—Western countries have extended most civil rights to all residents. An exception concerns conviction for serious crimes, which may lead to an alien’s loss of residence permit and deportation. Germany and Switzerland have relatively strict rules in this regard whereas, in France and the Netherlands, the possibilities to expel foreigners are more limited (Koopmans et al. 2005: 42–3).

Many social rights are also available to citizens and residents alike, but long-term dependence on social welfare may block access to a secure residence status or to naturalisation in some countries, including Germany and Switzerland (Bauböck
1995; Guiraudon 2000; Koopmans et al. 2005). The political rights to vote and to stand for election have, in contrast, generally not been granted to non-nationals (Layton-Henry 1990), although in some countries, including the Netherlands and Sweden, foreign residents can vote and be elected in local elections.

Racism and discrimination can be important barriers to the realisation of equal rights. Anti-discrimination legislation in the UK and the Netherlands compares favourably to most other European immigration countries (Koopmans et al. 2005: 45–9; Niessen and Chopin 2002). However, the Dutch situation differs from the British in that discrimination on the grounds of religion is fully covered by the legal framework and jurisprudence, whereas in the UK it is a long-standing complaint, particularly of Muslim organisations, that provisions under the Race Relations Act are badly suited to combatting discrimination related to religious difference (Modood 1988).

An example of the Dutch approach is a 2007 court case which overturned a decision by local authorities to deny social welfare benefits to a woman wearing full facial covering on the grounds that the impossibility for colleagues or customers to see her face and eyes made her *de facto* unemployable. Although an extreme (though not a singular) case, this woman’s situation illustrates one way in which multiculturalism combined with a relatively generous welfare state, can lead to socio-economic marginalisation. Letting the woman’s interpretation of her religious duties prevail over the local government’s concern with employability has the likely consequence that she will remain a life-long dependent on social welfare benefits. That this is a choice she is willing to make is, in turn, related to the level of benefits in the Netherlands, which does not (in combination with other forms of aid for low incomes such as rent subsidies) condemn one to abject poverty.

The Migration and Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) developed by the British Council and the Migration Policy Group allows a comparative assessment of the degree of legal equality of immigrants across 25 EU member-states, Norway, Switzerland and Canada. Countries score high on the index when immigrants can easily and with minimal preconditions obtain equal rights. The index covers 140 indicators in six areas: access to nationality, long-term residence, anti-discrimination, family reunion, labour market access and political participation.

Table 1 presents the overall Index scores for the eight countries of the present study. Sweden offers the greatest degree of legal equality to immigrants, followed by Belgium and the Netherlands. These countries not only form the top three in Table 1, but also in the larger MIPEX comparison of 28 countries. The three German-speaking countries—Germany, Switzerland and Austria—are characterised by a relatively high degree of inequality between immigrants and non-immigrants. Austria occupies a particularly low position in the ranking of ‘best integration practices’; among the 28 countries, it occupies the 26th place.

The next column of the table shows the stability of cross-national differences over time, by comparing the 2007 MIPEX scores to the Legal Obstacles to Integration
Index (LOI) compiled by Waldrauch and Hofinger (1997) for the year 1995. Despite the turbulences and controversies around immigration and integration in recent years, cross-national differences have been remarkably stable over the period 1995–2007. Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands formed the top three countries in both years although, in 1995, the Netherlands came in second place, before Belgium. Austria and Switzerland offered the least equality in both years; France remained in the middle of the spectrum. The only major difference between the two distributions concerns the UK, which scored worse than France and Germany in the 1995 LOI index. Waldrauch and Hofinger themselves, however, expressed doubts about the validity of this result, which is mainly due to the fact that, in the British common-law tradition, many immigrant rights are not formally laid down in legislation but determined by jurisprudence. ‘Therefore’, the authors conclude, ‘the UK, being the methodological “problem child” in the sample, might be judged by the LOI-index as being more rigid than it really is’ (Waldrauch and Hofinger 1997: 279). An additional reason why the UK offers more equality in the 2007 index is that the LOI index did not include anti-discrimination policies, an area where the UK compares favourably to many other countries.

Next to this individual equality dimension, Koopmans et al. (2005) distinguish a second dimension of immigrant rights: cultural rights attributed to them as a group, and cultural obligations that the state expects immigrants to meet before obtaining full citizenship rights. Whereas the individual equality dimension of citizenship measured by the MIPEX and LOI indices refers to the equal treatment of residents regardless of their race, ethnicity, religion, nationality or cultural background, the cultural dimension of citizenship refers to differential rights and institutions based on racial, cultural or religious group membership. This second dimension of citizenship has been at the centre of philosophical discussions on multiculturalism and assimilation (Joppke and Lukes 1999; Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2002). Koopmans et al. (2005) considered the following areas for the cultural rights dimension of citizenship:

### Table 1. Degree of legal equality and cultural rights for immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MIPEX Index 2007&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>LOI Index 1995&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Cultural Rights Index 2002&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>–0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>–0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>–0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources**: www.integrationindex.eu; Koopmans et al. (2005); Waldrauch and Hofinger (1997).

**Notes**: <sup>a</sup>high score = high equality; <sup>b</sup>high score = low equality; <sup>c</sup>1 to +1; high score = many cultural rights.
cultural conditions for naturalisation;
- allowances for Islamic religious practices outside of public institutions (call to prayer, slaughtering of animals, burial);
- cultural rights and provisions in public institutions (Islamic schools and religious classes, toleration of the headscarf, special programming in public broadcasting);
- political representation rights (special consultative bodies);
- affirmative action in the labour market.

The final column of Table 1 shows the overall score (on a scale from −1 to +1) of the five countries included in the Koopmans et al. study. The Netherlands has granted immigrants the broadest range of cultural rights, with the UK in second place and Germany in an intermediary position. France and Switzerland tend the most clearly towards an assimilationist position, granting relatively few cultural rights to immigrants and demanding a relatively high degree of cultural conformity in public institutions. France is also the only country where there is a clear contrast between the two dimensions of citizenship, as it is relatively inclusive on the individual equality dimension but reluctant to grant cultural rights.

The lack of other systematic studies of the cultural dimension of citizenship makes it difficult to indicate precisely where countries outside this set of five are situated. Sweden emerges from the literature as the European country that most closely approximates the kind of multicultural policies found in the Netherlands (see Ålund and Schierup 1991; Runblom 1994; Soininen 1999). Belgium shares with the Netherlands a history of social and religious segmentation known as ‘pillarisation’ (Huyse 1987; Lijphart 1968), which has also led to a segmented incorporation approach with regard to immigrants. However, there are important differences in Belgium between the two language regions, with Wallonia following a more French-style approach, and Flanders more strongly influenced by the Dutch multicultural approach (Bousetta et al. 1999; Gsir et al. 2005). Where possible, therefore, I will present data on the two parts of Belgium separately.

Some examples from various spheres of society may illustrate Dutch policies regarding cultural rights for immigrants. In the realm of education (see Koopmans et al. 2005: 57–61) the Netherlands were, until 2004 when the programme was discontinued, one of the few European countries offering full state funding for education in ‘own language and culture’. Classes in minority religions are still offered in public schools, and the Dutch education system has allowed Muslims and Hindus to establish dozens of fully state-funded denominational schools—more widespread in the Netherlands than in any other European country although, even in the Netherlands, they only cover a modest percentage of all Muslim and Hindu children.

Dutch public radio and television are legally obliged to reserve 20 per cent of their broadcasting time for programmes catering to ethnic minorities, some of them in immigrants’ own languages. In 2002, for example, national public television aired a children’s programme simultaneously in four languages: Dutch, Turkish, Arabic and Berber. In addition, there are subsidised Muslim and Hindu broadcasting...
organisations, which produce a few weekly hours of religious programmes on public radio and television, as well as dozens of local public television programmes catering to a variety of ethnic groups produced by the state-subsidised broadcasting organisation Multicultural Television Netherlands (MTNL). Since the 1980s, the Netherlands have had a series of affirmative-action programmes for the public sector; some general, some for specific professions such as the police or the military. The Dutch state even assists dual Turkish nationals who are employed in the Dutch police or military by offering—since 2002—an interest-free loan of €6,000 and 20 days’ paid leave to enable them to fulfil their military service obligations in Turkey. A further example of positive action is the programme Mozaïek of the Dutch Science Foundation (NWO) which, since 2004, finances PhD training and scholarships reserved for students from ethnic minority backgrounds. Affirmative action in the private sector has been much more limited. Unlike public sector programmes, legislation for the private sector did not entail preferential hiring but only a duty for employers to develop and report on measures taken to increase the share of minorities in the workforce. This legislation—the so-called Wet Samen—was discontinued in 2004.

Some public housing corporations have built special projects for ethnic and religious groups: e.g. a multi-generation housing complex for Hindus (completed in 2006) and a housing project for elderly Muslims in 2002 in The Hague. The ‘Muslim’ character of this project is expressed in the orientation of the toilet seat (not facing Mecca) and in a separation of ‘private’ and ‘public’ spaces in the apartment, with the kitchen in the middle, de facto allowing the woman of the house to serve the men in the public part without being seen by them. Finally, the Dutch state subsidises a wide spectrum of immigrant organisations on an ethnic and religious basis and has co-opted their leaders in representative councils for each main ethnic group, which have significant consultation prerogatives.

Welfare-State Regimes in Comparative Perspective

I argue here that the effects of immigrant integration policies on the socio-economic position of immigrants are to an important extent mediated by the structure of the welfare state. Esping-Andersen has distinguished three types of welfare state on the basis of their degrees of ‘decommodification’, which ‘occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market’ (1990: 21–2). Decommodification entails both the scope of welfare-state entitlements, and the provision levels of these entitlements. In Esping-Andersen’s typology, ‘social-democratic’ welfare states have the highest, ‘liberal’ welfare states the lowest, and ‘conservative’ welfare states intermediary levels of decommodification. Among the eight countries I analyse, Sweden belongs to the social-democratic type, the UK (along with, for instance, the USA, Canada and Australia) to the liberal type, and France, Germany and Switzerland to the conservative type. Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands straddle the conservative
type and the social-democratic type, depending on which aspect of decommodifica-
tion one considers, and of course on the somewhat arbitrary decision on where to
draw the line between the types. The scores of our eight countries on Esping-
Andersen’s index are shown in Table 2, first column. The data refer to 1980, which
raises the question of whether differences across welfare states have changed since
then. Scruggs’ (2006) analysis of 2002 data, second column of Table 2, shows a high
degree of stability in the rank ordering of countries. The only change concerns
Switzerland, which had an average level of decommodification in 1980, but which
received the second-lowest score for ‘expected benefits’ in 2002. Combining the two
indicators in a summed score we can conclude that, during the period 1980–2002, the
UK had by far the least-decommodified welfare-state regime and Sweden the most
generous and inclusive (Table 2, final column).

Why would welfare-state ‘decommodification’ or ‘benefit generosity’ matter for the
socio-economic position of immigrants compared to non-immigrants? I suggest
three reasons. The first can be derived from Borjas’ (1989) well-known and
empirically corroborated (Van Tubergen 2004) hypothesis that immigrants with
lower educational skills and a concomitant weaker labour market position will tend
to migrate to countries with a relatively equal income distribution, which offer
disadvantaged groups relatively good protection against economic adversity.
Immigration to countries with relatively inclusive and generous welfare states will
thus be ‘negatively selected’, whereas countries with higher levels of social inequality
will be more attractive as a destination for skilled immigrants.

Second, once in the host country, immigrants’ decisions on whether or not to
invest in improving their human capital in order to find employment (or to prevent
becoming unemployed) will be influenced by similar considerations (Chiswick and
Miller 1995: 248–9). In welfare states with low provision levels the economic sanction
associated with being dependent on welfare benefits is greater and there are strong
push factors for immigrants to invest in improving their labour market chances
through language acquisition, education and gaining knowledge about and develop-
ing ties with the host society. By contrast, in generous welfare systems, immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Indicators of welfare-state inclusiveness and benefit levels</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decommodification</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>score 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

with human and social capital deficiencies can maintain a comparatively decent standard of living without making such adaptations.

This tendency can be reinforced by a third mechanism, the subjective perception of welfare benefit levels. Even in comparatively generous welfare states, it is certainly no luxury to be dependent on social assistance. However, how the standard of living associated with being dependent on welfare benefits is subjectively perceived is likely to be different for natives than for immigrants, particularly those of the first generation. Deprivation is always relative (Gurr 1970) and depends on comparisons of a present situation with one’s own past, or with the situation of relevant reference groups. For natives, the relevant comparison group consists of other, but better-off natives, and thus welfare dependence is likely to be seen as a strong source of relative deprivation. For immigrants and natives alike, welfare dependence will compare negatively (how negatively will depend on the welfare regime) to their former situation when still employed in the country of immigration. However, for immigrants that source of relative deprivation is not always relevant in the context of European welfare states because sizeable numbers of migrants (especially refugees) go straight into welfare dependence without any prior employment history. In 2002 in the Netherlands, for instance, 40, 34 and 33 per cent respectively of recent immigrants from Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia were dependent on social security and welfare benefits (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 2004: 122).

With or without prior employment in the host country, for immigrants their current situation will also be judged in relation to their economic situation (or that of their parents) when they were still in the country of origin. Even for those on welfare benefits, that comparison is likely to be positive, because their income from welfare benefits is likely to be well above what they earned in the country of origin, even correcting for the greater cost of living in the country of immigration. Moreover, immigrants will compare their economic situation to that of family members, friends and co-villagers who stayed behind in the country of origin. That comparison, too, will often be favourable, even for those dependent on welfare benefits. All in all, relative deprivation as a push factor to invest in the acquisition of human capital is likely to be considerably weaker for immigrants than for natives, the more so the higher the level of provisions that a particular welfare regime offers. In other words, my expectation is that the socio-economic gap between immigrants and natives is likely to be highest in comparatively generous welfare states such as Sweden, and lowest in liberal welfare states such as the UK.

The Interaction Between Integration Policies and Welfare Regimes

Integration policies and welfare regimes interact through a number of mechanisms. First, integration policies determine access to equal rights in general, and thus also to entitlements to welfare benefits. In the countries considered here, welfare-state rights are in principle accessible to all legal residents, but being dependent on welfare may have negative consequences. It may impact on the possibility for a migrant to bring
over a spouse from the country of origin or to obtain a more secure residence permit. In theory at least, in countries such as Germany and Switzerland, ‘reproachable’ long-term dependence on social welfare can lead to deportation. Such disadvantages of welfare dependence can be avoided if an immigrant naturalises, but Germany, for example, makes naturalisation conditional on not being dependent on welfare. As a result, welfare dependence is associated with much greater disadvantages and risks in Austria, Germany and Switzerland, where the protection of citizenship is difficult to obtain, than in countries with open citizenship regimes such as France, the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden.

Second, the cultural dimension of integration policies may have consequences for the human capital deficiencies with which immigrants enter the labour market. Policies that emphasise linguistic and cultural assimilation exert pressure on immigrants to acquire skills, knowledge and social ties that improve their chances on the labour market. By contrast, multicultural policies that emphasise immigrants’ own language and culture, and stimulate migrants to orient themselves towards their ethnic community, may have the unintended consequence of sustaining linguistic deficiencies and a lack of cultural ‘soft skills’. Moreover, the emphasis in multicultural policies on the migrants’ own group and the maintenance of the group’s language and culture may be detrimental to the development of social contacts, across ethnic boundaries, with natives, thus depriving immigrants of an important source of social capital, since natives hold the keys to much of the knowledge and positional resources relevant for successful labour market integration.

Positive effects of language acquisition on labour market participation have been corroborated in many studies (e.g. Chiswick and Miller 1995; Dustmann and Fabbri 2003; Van Tubergen et al. 2004). Chiswick and Miller (1995: 257–8) cite Australian findings that show that English language proficiency among immigrant groups declined after the introduction in the 1960s of minority language classes in schools. They hypothesise that this is caused by the fact that policies of linguistic pluralism decrease the likelihood of English becoming the language spoken at home in immigrant families.

Granovetter (1973) has stressed the importance of network ties for access to labour market opportunities. It is not entirely clear whether it is necessarily always ‘weak ties’ with relatively distant persons that are the most effective, but clearly the persons with whom network ties exist should have ‘superior knowledge and influence’ (Wegener 1991: 60). For this reason, social contacts with natives will generally be more valuable to an immigrant for improving access to labour market opportunities than social contacts with other immigrants, because the latter are likely to share a lack of social knowledge and influence. Dutch research shows that there is indeed a positive association between the labour market participation of immigrants and the degree to which they have contacts with ethnic Dutch (e.g. Dagevos 2001; Engbersen 2003). Beyond direct effects on socio-economic mobility, contacts with natives can also have an indirect effect because they promote acquisition of the majority language. Chiswick and Miller (1995), for instance, find that being married to a native spouse
and living in an area with a low concentration of co-ethnics are strong predictors of majority language proficiency. The negative effect on language acquisition of living in an area with many co-ethnics is greatest for those immigrants who are less-educated, and who therefore already run a higher risk of unemployment (Chiswick and Miller 1995: 263).

Cross-national evidence on host-language proficiency is scant, but the available evidence indicates a negative association with multicultural policies. In a comparative study, Dagevos et al. (2007: 45–6) show that, whereas 52 per cent of German Turks report a good command of the German language (and 19 per cent report bad or no command), only 39 per cent of Dutch Turks do so (and 28 per cent bad or no command). Ersanilli and Koopmans (2007) compared Turks in the Netherlands, Germany and France, and found that Dutch Turks use the least often—and have the most difficulty using—the host-country language and experience the least difficulty with the Turkish language. French Turks are significantly more proficient in the host-language, use it more often in contacts with friends, spouses, children and parents, and experience more difficulties with Turkish than their counterparts in Germany and the Netherlands.

The same study by Ersanilli and Koopmans (2007) also provides rare cross-national evidence on the degree of social contacts between Turkish immigrants and members of the ethnic majority. Controlling for individual background variables, French Turks were the most likely to go out with ethnic French friends and to receive them as visitors at home, whereas German Turks were more likely to have contacts with German ethnics at work. Taking work and private contacts together, Dutch Turks have the least access to interethnic social capital. As we will see below, evidence on spatial segregation corroborates this finding of a relatively low degree of social contact between immigrants and natives in the Netherlands, and a greater degree of social integration in France and Germany.

Cross-National Differences in the Composition of the Immigrant Population

Given the important differences in degrees of integration among immigrants from varying countries of origin (Van Tubergen 2004), aggregate data on labour market participation, segregation and crime may be influenced by composition effects. Some authors have suggested that the comparatively weak socio-economic integration of immigrants in the Netherlands results from the fact that the country has taken up more—and less-educated—immigrants than other European countries (Böcker and Thränhardt 2003; Doomernik 1998). If this were correct, cross-national differences could simply be due to the different compositions of the immigrant population in various countries, and would have little to do with integration policies and welfare-state regimes.

However, this explanation for Dutch integration outcomes does not seem to be valid, nor does it fit the more general pattern of cross-national differences that we will encounter below, in which Sweden and Belgium share comparatively low labour
market participation, and high residential segregation and immigrant crime rates with the Netherlands. The statistical compendium on stocks and flows of immigrants compiled by Lederer (1997) shows that, over the period 1960–94, the Netherlands had a higher per capita net immigration rate than Belgium, France or the UK, but a lower rate than Sweden, Austria, Germany and Switzerland. Nor do the available statistical data suggest that the Netherlands has taken up more lower-educated immigrants. Van Suntum and Schloböll (2002) present comparative data on the gap in the education levels of non-Western immigrants compared to the native population and show that immigrants to the Netherlands lag further behind the native population than their counterparts in Great Britain and Sweden but do not lag as far behind the native population as immigrants in Germany, France, Belgium and Austria.

Nevertheless, where possible, my analyses will control for variation in the composition of the immigrant population. Labour market data will refer only to immigrants from non-EU countries, thus controlling for the fact that, in some countries (such as Switzerland), a relatively large proportion of immigrants originates in EU countries, whereas in others (such as the Netherlands), a relatively large percentage comes from outside the EU. In addition, for a few countries, comparative data on labour market participation that focus on specific ethnic groups are available. Comparative data on spatial segregation are available separately for a number of ethnic groups such as Turks and Moroccans. Only the incarceration data unfortunately allow no disaggregation to specific countries or regions of origin.

The Labour Market Integration of Immigrants Cross-Nationally Compared

From the arguments and evidence on integration policies and welfare-state regimes discussed above, we can derive the following hypotheses:

H1: The labour market participation of immigrants (relative to the native population) will be lower in relatively generous welfare states of the ‘social-democratic’ type (Sweden), higher in countries with ‘liberal’ welfare states (UK), and intermediate in countries that have ‘conservative’ welfare states (Germany, France, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands).

H2: The labour market participation of immigrants will be higher in countries where equal citizenship rights are difficult to acquire (Austria, Switzerland, Germany), lower where individual citizenship rights are easy to acquire and pressures towards cultural assimilation are low (UK, Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium-Flanders), and intermediate where individual rights are easily accessible but cultural assimilation pressures are high (France, Belgium-Wallonia).

Combining Hypotheses 1 and 2 leads to:

H3: Welfare regimes and integration policies interact multiplicatively: countries that have either limited welfare states with a low provision level (UK) or exclusive integration policies that make immigrants’ rights dependent on
cultural assimilation and avoidance of welfare dependence (Austria, Switzerland, Germany) will have a relatively high labour market participation of immigrants. Conversely, countries that have comparatively generous welfare states and multicultural integration policies (Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium-Flanders) will have a relatively low labour market participation of immigrants. Countries that combine a comparatively generous welfare state with integration policies that are individually inclusive but culturally assimilationist will have intermediate levels of immigrant labour market participation (France, Belgium-Wallonia).

Hypotheses 2 and 3 run counter to the policy philosophy of multiculturalism, which assumes that immigrants will integrate better, the easier and the quicker they can obtain formal equality, and the more they can retain and develop their own cultural identities and practices. On the basis of this assumption we would predict the exact opposite of the above hypotheses, namely relatively high immigrant labour market participation in the Netherlands and Sweden, and low participation rates in Germany and Austria, where immigrants face stronger barriers to formal equality, or in France, where there is little space for the recognition of cultural differences.

Table 3 shows data on the labour market participation of the population between 15 and 64 years of age (i.e. the percentage of persons in that category who are gainfully employed), comparing natives and persons born in non-EU-15 countries. Because absolute levels of net labour market participation depend on the state of the economy and the nature of a country’s system of social security, the most adequate measure for comparison is the relative rate of labour market participation of the non-EU foreign-born compared to the native-born, presented in the last column of the table. There is only one country—Austria—where there is almost no difference between the labour market participation of the two groups. Germany, Switzerland and Great Britain also perform relatively well, as do, to a lesser extent, France and Wallonia. The Netherlands, Sweden and Belgian Flanders have the lowest rates of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Native-born</th>
<th>Born non-EU-15 country</th>
<th>Relative employment level of persons born in non-EU-15 country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium – Wallonia</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium – Flanders</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


non-EU immigrant participation on the labour market. The rank ordering of countries is virtually the same when we consider men and women separately, with the exception that Sweden and the Netherlands switch positions regarding male immigrants.

Although we limit the comparison to immigrants from non-EU-15 countries, it is still possible that the cross-national differences can be attributed in whole or in part to different compositions of the population of non-EU immigrants. However, some controlled comparisons for specific immigrant groups are available which do not suggest that composition effects play an important role in explaining the cross-national differences that we find in Table 3. In a study comparing immigrants from the former Yugoslavia in Sweden and Austria, Kogan (2003: 607) finds that, in Austria, ex-Yugoslavs were more likely to be active in the labour force than native Austrians (84 per cent against 72 per cent) whereas, in Sweden, ex-Yugoslavs were much less likely to be active in the labour market than native Swedes (54 per cent against 85 per cent). Euwals et al. (2006: 30) have undertaken a similar comparison of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands, in which they use the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition method to compute differences between natives and Turkish immigrants that are standardised for the impact of age and the level of education. In both countries, the standardised employment rate of Turkish immigrants is lower than that of natives. However, the gap between native and Turkish labour market participation is much larger in the Netherlands (21 per cent for men and 20 per cent for women) than in Germany (6 per cent for men and 7 per cent for women).

If we return to the hypotheses that we formulated at the beginning of this section, we can conclude that they are largely confirmed by the comparative data. In line with Hypothesis 1, the UK, with its liberal welfare regime, shows a relatively good labour market integration of non-EU immigrants, whereas the Swedish social-democratic welfare state is associated with relatively poor levels. However, the welfare-state perspective does not explain why Austria, Germany and Switzerland have even higher rates than the UK, and why the Netherlands and Flanders perform as poorly as Sweden. Moreover, the welfare-state perspective does not explain why Wallonia does better than Flanders, because the welfare-state regime is— unlike important aspects of integration policies—uniform across Belgium.

These deviations are well-explained by the second hypothesis, which claims that the labour market participation of immigrants will be inversely related to the ease with which they can obtain formal equality and the absence of strong pressures towards cultural assimilation. In turn, the integration policy perspective is faced with the deviation of the UK, which grants immigrants a relatively high degree of equality and recognition of cultural differences, but still achieves a relatively high level of labour market integration. The combined Hypothesis 3 therefore best captures the results: countries that either have a limited welfare state or a restrictive and assimilationist integration regime display the highest level of immigrant labour market participation. By contrast, countries that combine a generous welfare state with easy access to equal citizenship rights and limited assimilation pressures
(Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgian Flanders) show the poorest labour market integration of immigrants.

**Residential Segregation Cross-Nationally Compared**

When we consider residential segregation, it is less obvious to expect an effect of welfare-state regimes. On the one hand, strong welfare states reduce income inequality, which may increase the opportunities of immigrants on the housing market. On the other hand, we have seen that immigrants tend to be more often economically inactive in strong welfare states, which may again reduce their opportunities on the housing market, because it makes them dependent on cheap or subsidised housing that tends to be concentrated in certain neighbourhoods.

A more-clear-cut expectation can be formulated regarding the effect of integration policies. Segregation is not just determined by financial opportunities, but also by cultural preferences for living among people of the same ethnicity or religion, both among immigrant minorities and among the native majority. Although the voluntary self-segregation of immigrants may play a role, generally the preferences of the majority will have a stronger impact on segregation patterns. Members of the majority have more opportunities to choose where to live, because of higher disposable income, better knowledge of the housing market and in some cases—such as the Netherlands—because housing distribution systems privilege those with longer periods of local residence. My hypothesis is that preferences for living among co-ethnics for both immigrants and the majority population will be enhanced by integration policies that de-emphasise assimilation and that encourage immigrants to maintain their own cultural practices. Policies of cultural difference can contribute to the estrangement of the majority population from minorities because of linguistic communication problems and divergent cultural practices, which make natives feel less ‘at home’ in neighbourhoods where many immigrants come to live (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). The guiding hypothesis for this section therefore is:

**H4:** The residential segregation of immigrants will be more pronounced in countries with multicultural integration policies such as the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and Belgium, and less pronounced in countries that put more emphasis on the assimilation of immigrants to the majority culture—Austria, Germany, France and Switzerland.

Residential segregation is difficult to compare cross-nationally. In addition to the usual problem of variation in the composition of immigrant populations, segregation data are sensitive to the size of the spatial units (wards, districts etc.) that are used to compute indices (Musterd 2005; Musterd and de Winter 1998). However, this problem is manageable, as data for some cities are available for different spatial levels of aggregation, showing that the choice of the unit of analysis has only a small effect on the resulting segregation indices.13
Table 4 presents data for a range of ethnic groups in cities in the eight countries discussed in this paper. The results make two things clear. First, that there are important differences across ethnic groups. In both the UK and the Netherlands, levels of segregation are much higher for groups with a Muslim background than for Caribbean blacks (Surinamese in the Netherlands). In Stockholm (see Murdie and Borgegard 1998: 1879) we find similar differences between Muslim groups such as Turks, Somalis and Iranians on the one hand, and European immigrants (not

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Immigrant group</th>
<th>SI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antwerp</td>
<td>North Africans</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>68–79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>Pakistanis</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>63–75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>Pakistanis</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>Iranians</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>Somalis</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hague</td>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hague</td>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Pakistanis</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hague</td>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Black Caribbeans</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>Black Caribbeans</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>40–45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hague</td>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zurich</td>
<td>Turks*</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ile de France</td>
<td>Moroccans*</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ile de France</td>
<td>Algerians*</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Düsseldorf</td>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Düsseldorf</td>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bern</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lille</td>
<td>Non-French</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>Algerians</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Gächter (2005; Bern); Heye and Leuthold (2004; Zurich); Murdie and Borgegard (1998; Stockholm, Turks and Somalis); Prêteceille (2006; Ile de France); all other data from Musterd (2005). All figures refer to segregation indices except those indicated * which refer to dissimilarity indices between the respective group and natives.
presented in the table) such as Poles (segregation index 20) or Yugoslavs (31) on the other. In Paris, we find similarly that Algerians live more segregated lives than the Portuguese (segregation index 12; see Musterd 2005: 334). These group differences confirm the above argument that segregation is related to the degree of cultural difference. As a result of a combination of self-segregation and avoidance by the majority, the more culturally distinct Muslim groups live more strongly physically segregated from the rest of the population than European immigrants or postcolonial immigrants from the Caribbean, who usually speak fluent Dutch or English and mostly have a Christian background.

Second, we observe major differences across cities and countries, even if we hold the region or country of origin of immigrant groups constant. These differences are largely in line with the expectations formulated in Hypothesis 4. Considering the Turks, we find that they have the highest rates of segregation in Stockholm and in the three Dutch cities, whereas in Zurich, Düsseldorf and Frankfurt they live more equally dispersed across the city. Another Swiss city, Bern, follows the same pattern, although here the data refer to all Muslims taken together.

Immigrants from the Maghreb (North Africans, Moroccans, Algerians) live most segregated in Antwerp and Brussels, followed by the three Dutch cities. Clearly lower levels of segregation of Maghrebians are found in Düsseldorf and Frankfurt, as well as in Paris and the peripheral region of Île de France. The latter finding is remarkable given the impression that has arisen because of the banlieue riots of 2005 and 2006, that French urban regions are characterised by particularly high levels of ethnic segregation.

Finally, for a few cities we can compare the segregation of all minorities or foreigners taken together. These results fall into the same pattern as those for Turks and Maghrebians. Levels of segregation are highest in the three Dutch cities, somewhat lower in Vienna, and clearly lower in Lille and Munich. For the UK, the only direct comparison that can be made is for Caribbeans with the Netherlands, which shows higher levels of segregation in British than in Dutch cities. Comparing the British figures for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis to the Muslim groups in other countries confirms that British cities are strongly segregated, at or above the levels of Antwerp, Brussels and Stockholm.

We can conclude from this section that there indeed seems to be a connection between multicultural integration policies and social segregation, as suggested by the high levels of residential segregation found in Belgium, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK. In contrast, countries that have put more emphasis on assimilation show more moderate levels of residential segregation. In Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands, high levels of spatial segregation combine with low labour market participation whereas, in the UK, high levels of ethnic segregation co-exist with a relatively high rate of labour market participation. Nevertheless, those groups that are the most strongly segregated in the UK—Pakistanis and Bangladeshis—are also the ones that have the lowest labour market participation (Modood et al. 1997). This suggests that the link between low labour market participation and segregation also
exists in the UK, but that it occurs at a higher overall level of labour market participation due to the country’s less-generous welfare state.

**Crime Levels Cross-Nationally Compared: Immigrants’ Share of the Prison Population**

If there is one aspect of integration that can be misused for mobilising ethnic hatred, it is immigrants’ real or alleged association with crime. There are several reasons why many immigrant groups across Europe display higher crime levels than the population average. Immigrants are disproportionately often unemployed and poor and they have a much younger population structure than the rest of the population. These are well-known risk factors for criminal behaviour. Part of the overrepresentation of immigrants among those convicted for crimes may, in addition, be due to discriminatory tendencies among the police or the judiciary.

The point that I want to make, therefore, is not that immigrants are more likely to be criminals than other citizens. What interests me here is to what extent there are cross-national differences in the rate of overrepresentation of immigrants among the prison population. Because the chances of getting involved in criminal behaviour are strongly linked to a person’s socio-economic position, my hypothesis is:

**H5:** Countries with low labour market participation of immigrants will also be those where immigrants are more strongly overrepresented among the prison population.

Table 5 shows the share of foreigners in the prison population relative to the share of foreign citizens in the whole population of a country. Unfortunately, no cross-national incarceration data are available on the basis of ethnicity or country of birth. However, Table 5 includes alternative statistical indicators for two countries, based on the foreign-born prison population in the Netherlands, and on racial minorities in the UK, measures which, although they strongly influence absolute incarceration rates (first column, Table 5), do not strongly affect the measure that interests us here, namely the degree of overrepresentation of immigrants in the prison population (third column).

The variation across the countries is stark. Overrepresentation of inmates from an immigrant background is by far the strongest in the Netherlands, where their share in the prison population is, depending on the statistical basis chosen, six to eight times as high as in the general population. In the UK, in contrast, foreigners and racial minorities are only two to three times more likely to be in prison. The cross-country differences in Table 5 are very similar to those we found for labour market participation. Next to the Netherlands, Sweden and Belgium also perform badly on both counts, whereas the overrepresentation of immigrants in German and Austrian and, to a lesser extent Swiss, prisons is comparatively limited. France is situated in the middle on both counts.
Table 5. Share of foreign persons in the prison population, 2002–04

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Foreigners as % of prison population</th>
<th>Foreigners as % of general population</th>
<th>Degree of overrepresentation of foreigners</th>
<th>Prison population rate per 100,000 inhabitants (2004)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (foreign-born, 2002)</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England and Wales</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom (racial minorities, 2000)</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: International Centre for Prison Studies; Home Office (racial minorities UK); Dienst Justitiële Inrichtingen (foreign-born NL); OECD figures on foreign population (see http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/worldbrief/, accessed 23 July 2009).*
One might alternatively argue that a strong overrepresentation of immigrants in prisons is not so much caused by variation in the levels of involvement of immigrants in crime as by differences in the general level of incarceration across countries. A similar level of immigrant incarceration might then lead to strong overrepresentation in countries with a generally low incarceration rate. Conversely, one can argue that tough crime policies characterised by high incarceration rates disproportionately affect immigrants, and that immigrant overrepresentation in the prison population will therefore be higher where general incarceration rates are high. As the final column of Table 5 shows, neither of these alternative explanations is valid as there is no correlation whatsoever between the general incarceration rate of the population and the degree to which immigrants are overrepresented.

Conclusions

The experiences of the North-West European immigration countries considered in this paper can be seen as a natural experiment on the integration of immigrant newcomers and the management of cultural diversity. These were all relatively ethnically homogenous countries that turned into immigration countries at roughly the same time in the 1950s and 1960s. With the exception of Britain—where postcolonial immigrants from the Caribbean and South Asia predominated—all recruited a large part of their immigrant populations from Mediterranean countries, including the Muslim countries of the Maghreb and Turkey.

The policies that countries developed to incorporate these immigrants were, in the initial guestworker days, quite similar, but started to diverge once it became clear that immigration had become a permanent phenomenon. Countries with a more ethnic tradition of citizenship—Germany, Austria and Switzerland—chose to retain high barriers to migrants becoming full citizens and made residence rights dependent on performance in the labour market and the absence of a criminal record. Moreover, these countries made few concessions to immigrants’ cultural specificity. The Netherlands and Sweden chose the opposite direction and argued that integration could best be achieved by granting immigrants easy access to full citizenship rights, security of residence—even in the case of welfare dependence or conviction for crimes—and state support and protection for their languages, cultures and ethnic organisations and institutions. France followed a combination of individual equality and reluctance to recognise and promote cultural group differences.

Now, several decades after these policies were put into place, we can see how these different treatments have affected the outcomes of integration in a variety of domains such as the labour market, segregation and crime. The Netherlands plays a crucial role in this natural experiment, because the country implemented the prescripts of multiculturalism as a philosophy of integration (Favell 1998) to an extent that probably no other European country has. If we take the results of Dutch integration policies as a test case for whether state-sponsored multiculturalism is a successful recipe for the integration of immigrants, the conclusion is quite sobering. On the
basis of the multicultural philosophy, the Netherlands should have been comparatively successful in solving problems of integration and combating exclusion and segregation—quite the contrary, however: the Netherlands are faced with low labour market participation, strong segregation and comparatively high levels of crime among immigrants. The Netherlands shares these disappointing integration outcomes with two countries that have followed a similar integration philosophy, Sweden and (particularly the Flemish part of) Belgium. By contrast, Austria, Germany and Switzerland—which should, according to the assumptions of the multicultural integration philosophy, face particularly acute integration problems—actually perform better, whether we look at labour market participation, segregation levels or incarceration rates.

I have emphasised that it is important to consider the interaction between multicultural integration policies and the welfare state. In countries with a limited welfare state such as the UK and the classical immigration countries, immigrants are, by and large, forced by the discipline of the market to make it on their own. Although a few may survive in ethnic niches, most immigrants will have to acquire the linguistic and cultural skills that are necessary to earn a living. However, in the Netherlands, Sweden and Belgium, immigrants were able to survive on welfare support without making such adjustments. The less-tolerant reactions to immigrants in European welfare states must also be seen in this context. In the absence of a strong welfare state, immigration tends to be economically advantageous to most people, because it makes services and products available at a lower cost. But given the welfare-state dependency that multicultural policies have brought about in the Netherlands, Sweden and Belgium, immigrants are not necessarily an economic enrichment (see, for the Netherlands, Ederveen et al. 2004; Lakeman 1999; Van Dalen 2001).

Why did other European countries do better? The United Kingdom showed favourable outcomes regarding the labour market and crime levels, but it has very high levels of residential segregation. The fact that native Britons, and especially Muslim immigrants, often live largely separate lives has, in recent years, become an issue of controversial debate in Britain, which started with the Community Cohesion Report (Home Office 2001) that evaluated the causes of ethnic riots in Northern English cities with a high concentration of Muslims in the summer of 2001. Since then, home-grown terrorist cells that originated in such segregated communities have added further fuel to these debates. Nonetheless, the UK can be seen as a country that has implemented multicultural policies—albeit of a more limited nature than the Netherlands—without producing negative socio-economic integration outcomes, with the notable exception of residential segregation. The reason I advance is that the UK has a less-generous welfare state than Continental North-West European countries, with more emphasis on self-reliance and more opportunities for low-wage employment. An additional explanation for the comparatively favourable British results may be that the British immigrant population is strongly dominated by postcolonial groups, which had pre-existing linguistic and cultural ties to the immigration country.
The German-speaking countries have achieved their comparatively good performance along a different path. Although these countries, or at least Germany and Austria, have relatively generous and encompassing welfare states, their restrictive aliens legislation has made naturalisation and residence rights dependent on performance. Immigrants who become long-term dependent on social welfare risk expulsion; it can also be a barrier to a more secure residence status. In these countries an immigrant also risks his or her residence status or will fail to get a more secure one in the case of conviction for crimes, even relatively minor ones. In a way, these welfare states have replaced the discipline that the market exerts on immigrants in countries such as the UK or the United States with the discipline of the state. In contrast, the Dutch and Swedish approaches, which offered immigrants encompassing rights including unrestricted access to the full panoply of welfare-state benefits without demanding much in return, may have been well-intentioned but, instead of building on immigrants’ ambitions and energy, have often turned them into passive welfare-state clients.

To prevent such outcomes, European countries may choose to restrict the accessibility and benefit levels of welfare and social security, and thus to become more like the UK or the US. A recent move in this direction in the Netherlands has been to abolish entitlements to social welfare for those under the age of 27. Another type of policy response that many European countries have adopted—not, coincidentally, first introduced in the Netherlands—has been an increased emphasis on linguistic and, to some extent also cultural, assimilation in the form of obligatory integration courses for both newly arriving immigrants, and those dependent on welfare. A final possible policy response would be to move in the direction of the German-speaking countries by making access to full citizenship rights dependent on performance.

I emphasise that the sobering conclusions that this paper draws about multiculturalism as an integration policy strategy only pertain to its effects on socio-economic participation and equality. It may well be the case that multicultural policies have been successful in other regards, for instance the political participation of immigrants (Fennema and Tillie 1999). Moreover, legitimate normative reasons have been advanced (see inter alia, Carens 2000; Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2002) to explain why state support for, and recognition of, cultural differences is valuable for its own sake. However, the data presented in this paper indicate that, in considering such policies, one should take into account—at least in the context of developed welfare states—that there are real trade-offs with the goals of socio-economic participation and equality. Normative theorists of multiculturalism have a tendency to be preoccupied almost exclusively with formal rights and recognition, but it is equally necessary and normatively important to look at the outcomes of integration policies in terms of participation, equality and segregation. If there is one thing the European experience teaches us, it is that, in dealing with the complex issues of difference and equality in immigration societies, we cannot simply assume that what
is normatively preferable from a rights-focused point of view will also be practically efficient from an outcomes perspective.

Notes

[1] Naturalisations in the Netherlands peaked in 1996, when no less than 11 per cent of the stock of foreign residents was naturalised over the course of one year. Among the eight countries compared here, the Netherlands (6.9 per cent) had, in 2002, the second-highest naturalisation rate after Sweden (7.9 per cent), and before Belgium (6.7); see http://www.migrationinformation.org/, accessed 23 July 2009.


[13] The figures in Table 4 for Bangladeshis in Birmingham and London are based on the ward level (about 10,000 inhabitants, the lower bound of the range) or alternatively the enumeration district level (about 500 inhabitants, the upper bound of the range) as the unit of analysis. The Amsterdam range for Turks refers to three levels of spatial aggregation, distinguishing respectively 1,216 grids (the upper bound) and 389 or 93 neighbourhoods (with identical segregation levels at the lower bound); see Musterd (2005): 333–4.

References


