

CHANGING MEDIA, CHANGING CHINA

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Changing Media, Changing China

Susan L. Shirk

OVER THE PAST thirty years, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have relinquished their monopoly over the information reaching the public. Beginning in 1979, they allowed newspapers, magazines, and television and radio stations to support themselves by selling advertisements and competing in the marketplace. Then in 1993, they funded the construction of an Internet network. The economic logic of these decisions was obvious: requiring mass media organizations to finance their operations through commercial activities would reduce the government's burden and help modernize China's economy. And the Internet would help catapult the country into the ranks of technologically advanced nations. But less clear is whether China's leaders anticipated the profound political repercussions that would follow.

This collection of essays explores how transformations in the information environment—stimulated by the potent combination of commercial media and Internet—are changing China. The essays are written by Western China experts, as well as by pioneering journalists and experts from China, who write from personal experience about how television, newspapers, magazines, and Web-based news sites navigate the sometimes treacherous crosscurrents

of free information. Google has only a 25–30 percent share of the search engine business in China—the Chinese-owned Baidu has been favored by the government and most consumers—but Google is strongly preferred by the members of the highly educated urban elite.⁸ To prevent the controversy from stirring up opposition from this influential group, the Propaganda Department went to work. Overnight, the dominant opinion appearing on the Internet turned 180 degrees against Google and the United States.⁹ The pro-Google messages disappeared and were replaced by accusations against the U.S. government for colluding with Google to subvert Chinese sovereignty through its “information imperialism,” thereby creating suspicions that many of the new postings were bogus. The Propaganda Department asked respected Chinese academics to submit supportive newspaper essays, and provided ghostwriters. Online news portals were required to devote space on their front pages to the government’s counterattacks. To defend itself against the threat of a large-scale movement of Google devotees, the CCP fell back on anti-American nationalism. In March 2010 Google followed through on its threat and moved its search engine to Hong Kong; as a result, the Chinese government and not Google now does the filtering. Despite the unique features of the Google case, international as well as domestic conflicts over censorship are likely to be repeated as the party struggles to shape an increasingly pluralistic information environment.

In her book *Media Control in China*, originally published in 2004 by the international NGO Human Rights in China, journalist He Qinglian lambasts the CCP for its limits on press freedom. She describes Chinese journalists as “dancing in shackles.” Yet she also credits commercialization with “opening a gap in the Chinese government’s control of the news media.”¹⁰ Indeed, the competition for audiences provides a strong motivation for the press to break a news story before the propaganda authorities can implement a ban on reporting it—and it has provided an unprecedented space for protest, as was seen in the initial wave of pro-Google commentary. Caught between commercialization and control, journalists play a cat and mouse game with the censors, a dynamic that is vividly depicted in the case studies in this book.

Even partially relinquishing control of the mass media transforms the strategic interaction between rulers and the public in authoritarian political systems like China. Foreigners tend to dwell on the way the Chinese propaganda cops are continuing to censor the media, but an equally important

part of the story is the exponential expansion of the amount of information available to the public and how this is changing the political game within China. That change is the subject of this book.

OFFICIAL AMBIVALENCE

As journalist Qian Gang and his coauthor David Bandurski argue in chapter 2, Chinese leaders have a “deep ambivalence” toward the commercial media and the Internet: they recognize its potential benefits as well as its risks. Xiao Qiang, in chapter 9, uses the same term to describe the attitude of Chinese authorities toward the Internet.

By choosing to give up some degree of control over the media, the rulers of authoritarian countries like China make a trade-off. Most obviously, they gain the benefit of economic development; the market operates more efficiently when people have better information. But they also are gambling that they will reap political benefits; that relinquishing control of the media will set off a dynamic that will result in the improvement of the government’s performance and ultimately, they hope, in strengthening its popular support. The media improve governance by providing more accurate information regarding the preferences of the public to policymakers. National leaders also use media as a watchdog to monitor the actions of subordinate officials, particularly at the local level, so they can identify and try to fix problems before they provoke popular unrest. Competition from the commercial media further drives the official media and the government itself to become more transparent; to preserve its credibility, the government must release more information than it ever did before. In all these ways, the transformed media environment improves the responsiveness and transparency of governance. Additionally, a freer press can help earn international approval.

On the other hand, surrendering control over information creates severe political risks. It puts new demands on the government that it may not be able to satisfy, and it could reveal to the public the divisions behind the facade of party unity. Diminished control also provides an opening for political opposition to emerge. What most worries CCP leaders—and what motivates them to continue investing heavily in mechanisms to control media content—is the potential that a free information environment provides for organizing a challenge to their rule. The Chinese leaders’ fear of

free-flowing information is not mere paranoia; some comparative social science research indicates that allowing “coordination goods” like press freedom and civil liberties significantly reduces the odds for authoritarian regimes to survive in power.¹¹

What is the connection between information and antigovernment collective action? The more repressive a regime, the more dangerous it is to coordinate and engage in collective action to change that regime. Each individual dares to participate only if the risk of participating is outweighed by the potential benefits. One way to minimize the risk is the anonymity afforded by large numbers. Standing on Tiananmen Square carrying an antiregime sign is an act of political suicide if you are alone. It only makes sense to demonstrate if you know that a crowd will turn out.

Even before the Internet was created, news stories could create focal points for mobilizing mass protests. Cell phones and the Internet are even more useful for coordinating group action as they provide anonymity to the organizers and facilitate two-way communication of many to many. In April 1999, approximately ten thousand devotees of the Falun Gong spiritual sect used cell phones and the Internet to secretly organize a sit-in that surrounded the CCP and government leadership compound in Beijing. A decade before, the fax machine was the communication technology that made it possible for students to organize pro-democracy protests in Beijing's Tiananmen Square and more than 130 other cities. As the chapters in this book detail, in recent years a combination of newspaper reports, Internet communication tools, and cell phones has enabled student protests against Japan, demonstrations against rural land seizures, and protests against environmentally damaging industrial projects. The political possibilities of the latest social networking technologies like Twitter (a homegrown Chinese version is FanFou), Facebook (a Chinese version is Xiaonei), or the video-sharing program YouTube (a Chinese version is Youku) have yet to be fully tested in China.¹²

As Michael Suk-Young Chwe points out in his book *Rational Ritual*, media communication and other elements of culture make coordination possible by creating “common knowledge” that gives each person the knowledge that others have received the same message.¹³ When all news was communicated through official media, it was used to mobilize support for CCP policies: hence, the CCP had few worries about popular opposition. Thomas Schelling made this point with a characteristically apt analogy: “The participants of a square dance may all be thoroughly dissatisfied with

the particular dances being called, but as long as the caller has the microphone, nobody can dance anything else.”¹⁴ As the number and variety of microphones have increased, so have the force of public opinion and the risk of bottom-up mass action. The CCP propaganda authorities may have been reading Schelling: A June 2009 *People's Daily* commentary titled “The Microphone Era” says, “In this Internet era, everyone can be an information channel and a principal of opinion expression. A figurative comparison is that everybody now has a microphone in front of him.”¹⁵

Examples like the 2009 antigovernment protests in Iran and the so-called color revolutions in former Soviet states, as well as their own experiences, make Chinese politicians afraid that the free flow of information through the new media could threaten their rule. But it is worth considering the other possibility, namely, that the Internet might actually impede a successful revolutionary movement because venting online is a safer option than taking to the streets; and the decentralized nature of online communication splinters movements instead of integrating them into effective revolutionary organizations.¹⁶ Nevertheless, China's leaders are too nervous to risk completely ceding control of information.

MASS MEDIA IN TOTALITARIAN CHINA

In the prereform era, China had no journalism as we know it, only propaganda. Highly conscious of public opinion, the CCP devoted a huge amount of resources to managing popular views of all issues.¹⁷ In CCP lingo, the media were called the “throat and tongue” of the party; their sole purpose was to mobilize public support by acting as loudspeakers for CCP policies.¹⁸ The Chinese public received all of its highly homogenous information from a small number of officially controlled sources.

As of 1979, there were only sixty-nine newspapers in the entire country, all run by the party and government.¹⁹ The standard template consisted of photos and headlines glorifying local and national leaders on the front page, and invariably positive reports written in formulaic, ideological prose inside. Local news stories of interest such as fires or crimes were almost never reported. What little foreign news was provided had to be based on the dispatches of the government's Xinhua News Agency. People read the *People's Daily* and other official newspapers in the morning at work—offices and factories were required to have subscriptions. The 7 p.m. news on

China Central Television (CCTV) simply rehashed what had been in the *People's Daily*.²⁰ Newspaper editorials and commentaries were read aloud by strident voices over ubiquitous radio loudspeakers and then used as materials for obligatory political study sessions in the workplace.

A steady diet of propaganda depoliticized the public. As political scientist Ithiel de Sola Pool observed, "When regimes impose daily propaganda in large doses, people stop listening."²¹ CCP members, government officials, and politically sophisticated intellectuals, however, had to remain attentive. To get the information they needed to do their jobs—and to survive during the campaigns to criticize individuals who had made ideological mistakes that periodically swept through the bureaucracies—the elite deciphered the coded language of the official media by reading between the lines. Sometimes this esoteric communication was intended as a signal from the top CCP leaders to subordinates about an impending change in the official line.²² Kremlinology and Pekinology developed into a high art not only in foreign intelligence agencies, but also within Soviet and Chinese government circles themselves. In chapter 8, Daniela Stockmann describes survey research that she completed which shows that government officials and people who work with the government continue to read the official press to track policy trends.

A diet consisting solely of official propaganda left people craving trustworthy sources of information.²³ As in all totalitarian states, a wide information gap divided the top leaders from the public. Senior officials enjoyed ample access to the international media and an extensive system of internal intelligence gathered by news organizations and other bureaucracies (called *neican* in Chinese). But the vast majority of the public was left to rely on rumors picked up at the teahouse and personal observations of their neighborhoods and workplaces. (In modern democracies, the information gap between officialdom and the public has disappeared almost entirely: U.S. government officials keep television sets on in their offices and learn about international events first from CNN, not from internal sources.)

MEDIA REFORM

Beginning in the early 1980s, the structure of Chinese media changed. Newspapers, magazines, and television stations received cuts in their government subsidies and were driven to enter the market and to earn revenue.

In 1979 they were permitted to sell advertising, and in 1983 they were allowed to retain the profits from the sale of ads. Because people were eager for information and businesses wanted to advertise their products, profits were good and the number of publications grew rapidly. As Qian Gang and David Bandurski note in chapter 2, the commercialization of the media accelerated after 2000 as the government sought to strengthen Chinese media organizations to withstand competition from foreign media companies.

By 2005, China published more than two thousand newspapers and nine thousand magazines.²⁴ In 2003, the CCP eliminated mandatory subscriptions to official newspapers and ended subsidies to all but a few such papers in every province. Even nationally circulated, official papers like *People's Daily*, *Guangming Daily*, and *Economics Daily* are now sold at retail stalls and compete for audiences. According to their editors, *Guangming Daily* sells itself as "a spiritual homeland for intellectuals"; *Economics Daily* markets its timely economic reports; and the *People's Daily* promotes its authoritativeness.²⁵

About a dozen commercial newspapers with national circulations of over 1 million readers are printed in multiple locations throughout the country. The southern province of Guangdong is the headquarters of the cutting-edge commercial media, with three newspaper groups fiercely competing for audiences. Nanjing now has five newspapers competing for the evening readership. People buy the new tabloids and magazines on the newsstands and read them at home in the evening.

Though almost all of these commercial publications are part of media groups led by party or government newspapers, they look and sound completely different. In contrast to the stilted and formulaic language of official publications, the language of the commercial press is lively and colloquial. Because of this difference in style, people are more apt to believe that the content of commercial media is true. Daniela Stockmann's research shows that consumers seek out commercial publications because they consider them more credible than their counterparts from the official media. According to her research, even in Beijing, which has a particularly large proportion of government employees, only about 36 percent of residents read official papers such as the *People's Daily*; the rest read only semiofficial or commercialized papers.

Advertisers and many of the commercial media groups target young and middle-aged urbanites who are well-educated, affluent consumers. But publications also seek to differentiate themselves and appeal to specific

audiences. The Guangdong-based publications use domestic muckraking to attract a business-oriented, cosmopolitan audience. Because they push the limits on domestic political reporting—their editors are fired and replaced frequently—they have built an audience of liberal-minded readers outside Guangdong Province. According to its editors, *Southern Weekend* (*Nanfāng Zbōumo*), published by the *Nanfāng Daily* group under the Guangdong Communist Party Committee, considered one of the most critical and politically influential commercial newspapers, has a larger news bureau and greater circulation in politically charged Beijing than it does in southern China.²⁶ The Communist Youth League's popular national newspaper, *China Youth Journal*, has been a commercial success because it appeals to China's yuppies, the style-conscious younger generation with money to spend. The national foreign affairs newspaper, *Global Times*, tries to attract the same demographic by its often sensational nationalistic reporting of international affairs, as I discuss in chapter 10.

Media based out of Shanghai, the journalistic capital of China before the communist victory in 1949, are comparatively "very dull and quiet," according to Chinese media critics. The cause they cite is that the city's government has been slow to relinquish control.²⁷ Shanghai audiences prefer *Southern Weekend*, *Global Times*, and Nanjing's *Yangtze Evening News* to Shanghai-based papers, and Hunan television to their local stations.²⁸

Journalists now think of themselves as professionals instead of as agents of the government. Along with all the other changes referred to above, this role change began in the late 1970s. Chinese journalists started to travel, study abroad, and encounter "real" journalists. The crusading former editor in chief of the magazine *Caijing* (*Finance and Economy*) and author of chapter 3, Hu Shuli, recalls that before commercialization, "the news media were regarded as a government organization rather than a watchdog, and those who worked with news organizations sounded more like officials than professional journalists. [But] our teachers . . . encouraged us to pursue careers as professional journalists."²⁹ Media organizations now compete for the best young talent, and outstanding journalists have been able to bid up their salaries by changing jobs frequently. Newspapers and magazines are also recruiting and offering high salaries to bloggers who have attracted large followings. Yet most journalists still receive low base salaries and are paid by the article, which makes them susceptible to corruption. Corruption ranges from small transportation subsidies and "honoraria" provided to reporters for coverage of government and corporate news conferences to outright

corporate bribery for positive reporting and extortion of corporations by journalists threatening to write damaging exposés (see chapter 3). Establishing professional journalistic ethics is as difficult in China's Wild West version of early capitalism as it was in other countries at a similar stage of development.

Some journalists also have crossed over to political advocacy. In one unprecedented collective act, the national *Economic Observer* and twelve regional newspapers in March 2010 published a sharply worded joint editorial calling on China's legislature, the National People's Congress, to abolish the system of household residential permits (*hukou*) that forces migrants from the countryside to live as second-class citizens in the cities.³⁰ The authorities banned dissemination and discussion of the editorial but only after it had received wide distribution. At the legislative session, government leaders proposed some reforms of the *hukou* system, but not its abolition as demanded by the editorial.

MEDIA FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT CONTROL

All authoritarian governments face hard choices about how much effort and resources to invest in controlling various forms of media. In China, as in many other nondemocracies, television is the most tightly controlled. As Chinese television expert Miao Di explains in chapter 4, "because of television's great influence on the public today—it is the most important source of information for the majority of the population, reaching widely into rural as well as urban areas—it remains the most tightly controlled type of medium in China by propaganda departments at all administrative levels." All television stations are owned by national, provincial, municipal or county governments and used for propaganda purposes. Yet television producers must pay attention to ratings and audiences if they want to earn advertising revenue. As Miao Di puts it, "television today is like a double-gendered rooster: propaganda departments want it to crow while finance departments want it to lay eggs." The way most television producers reconcile these competing objectives is to "produce leisurely and 'harmless' entertainment programs," not hard news or commentary programs. Yet exceptions exist; Hunan television has found a niche with a lively nightly news show that eliminates the anchor and is reported directly by no-necktie journalists.

In the print realm, the government controls entry to the media market by requiring every publication (including news Web sites with original content) to have a license and by limiting the number of licenses. Only a handful of newspapers, magazines, and news Web sites are completely independent and privately financed. The rest may have some private financing but remain as part of media groups headed by an official publication and subordinate to a government or CCP entity that is responsible for the news content and appoints the chief editors. The chief editor of *Global Times*, appointed by the editors and CCP committee of *People's Daily*, acknowledged this in my interview with him: "If we veer too far away from the general direction of the upper level, I will get fired. I know that." However, there is a degree of variation. For example, magazines are somewhat more loosely controlled than newspapers, presumably because they appear less frequently and have smaller readerships. Additionally, newspapers focusing on economics and business appear to be allowed wider latitude in what they can safely report.

The publication that set a new standard for bold muckraking journalism is *Caijing* (*Finance and Economics*), a privately financed independent biweekly business magazine with a relatively small, elite readership. In chapter 3, former *Caijing* editor in chief Hu Shuli explains that "the Chinese government's control of the economic news arena, both in terms of licensing and supervision, has been relatively loose when compared with control over other news . . . [so much so that] even in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square event of 1989, economic news was little affected by censorship, while all other kinds of news were strictly monitored and controlled." Her analysis of the emergence of financial journalism in China recognizes the path-breaking role of private entrepreneurs and professional journalists, but also credits the "reform-minded economic officials" who appreciate the importance of a free flow of information for the effective functioning of a market economy. She notes that these economic officials didn't call out the CCP Propaganda Department even when *Caijing* broke an embarrassing scandal about the Bank of China's IPO in Hong Kong at the very time when the National People's Congress was holding its annual meeting; this is considered a politically sensitive period during which the propaganda authorities usually ban all bad news. Evan Osnos, in his *New Yorker* profile of Hu Shuli, observes that the differences among senior officials on media policy may protect *Caijing*, the magazine "had gone so far already that conservative branches of the government could no longer be sure which other officials supported it."³¹

In 2010, Hu Shuli and most of the staff of *Caijing* resigned in a conflict with the magazine's owners over editorial control and established Caixin Media, which publishes a weekly news magazine (*Century Weekly*), a monthly economic review (*China Reform*), and a Web site (Caing.com). Caixin is the first media organization in China to establish a Board of Trustees to safeguard its journalistic integrity. *Caijing*, its reputation damaged by the mass exodus of its journalists, is seeking to recoup by publishing exciting stories such as one that urged that Hubei governor Li Hongzhong be fired if he failed to apologize for ripping a journalist's tape recorder out of her hand when she challenged him at a press conference with a question he didn't like.³² The heated competition between the two media groups is likely to drive them to venture beyond business journalism with taboo-breaking stories that test the tolerance of the government.

Although China's leaders have embraced the Internet as a necessary element of the information infrastructure for a modern economy, as the size of the online public has grown, they have invested more and more heavily in controlling online content and containing its powerful potential to mobilize political opposition. The Internet offers individuals the means to learn about fast-breaking events inside and outside China, to write and disseminate their own commentaries, and to coordinate collective action like petitions, boycotts, and protests. The concept of the Netizen (*wangmin*) is laden with political meaning in a system lacking other forms of democratic participation.³³ As Xiao Qiang, the UC Berkeley-based editor of *China Digital Times*, observes in chapter 9, "The role of the Internet as a communications tool is especially meaningful in China where citizens previously had little to no opportunity for unconstrained public self-expression or access to free and uncensored information. Furthermore, these newfound freedoms have developed in spite of stringent government efforts to control the medium."

From the standpoint of the CCP leaders, the Internet is the most potent media threat. Young and well-educated city dwellers, whose loyalty is crucial for the survival of CCP rule, flock to the Internet for information, including information from abroad.³⁴ That is why the CCP reacted so defensively to the Google showdown and firmly refuses to permit unfiltered searches. Additionally, the Internet's capability for many-to-many two-way communication facilitates the coordination of collective action around the common knowledge of online information. There is no way for CCP leaders to predict whether virtual activism will serve as a harmless outlet for venting or a means to mobilize antigovernment protests in the street.

Government controls include the "Great Firewall," which can block entire sites located abroad and inside China and ingenious technological methods to filter and inhibit searches for keywords considered subversive. But as Xiao Qiang notes in chapter 9, "the government's primary strategy is to hold Internet service providers and access providers responsible for the behavior of their customers, so business operators have little choice but to proactively censor content on their sites." In addition, human monitors are paid to manually censor content.

Ever since the Mao Zedong era, the methods used by CCP leaders to inculcate political loyalty and ideological conformity have reflected an acute awareness that peer groups have a more powerful impact on individual attitudes than authority figures. It is for this reason that every Chinese citizen was required to undergo regular criticism and self-criticism in small groups of classmates or coworkers. Today's propaganda officials are applying this insight to their management of the information environment created on the Internet. To augment its censorship methods and neutralize online critics, the CCP has introduced a system of paid Internet commentators called the Fifty-Cent Army (*wu mao dang*). Individuals are paid approximately fifty cents in Chinese currency for each anonymous message they post that endorses the government's position on controversial issues. Local propaganda and Youth League officials are particularly keen to adopt this technique.³⁵ These messages create the impression that the tide of social opinion supports the government, put social and psychological pressure to conform on people with critical views, and thereby presumably reduce the possibility of antigovernment collective action. The July 2009 regulation that bans news Web sites from conducting online polls on current events and requires Netizens to use their real names when posting reactions on these sites appears to have the same aim of disrupting antigovernment common knowledge from forming on the Internet.³⁶

The large commercial news Web sites Sina.com, Sohu.com, and Netease.com are probably the second most widely used source of information in China after television, and the first place better-educated people go for their news. These sites have agreements with almost every publication in China (including some blogs) and many overseas news organizations that allow them to compile and reproduce their content and make it available to millions of readers. They are privately owned and listed on NASDAQ, but they are politically compliant, behaving more or less like arms of the government. To keep their privileged monopoly status, they cooperate closely with the State Council Information Office, which sends the managers of the

Web sites SMS text messages several times a day with "guidance" on which topics to avoid. The Information Office also provides a list of particularly independent publications that are not supposed to be featured on the front page. The news sites have opted to reduce their political risks by posting only hard news material that has first been published elsewhere in China. Although they produce original content about such topics as entertainment, sports, and technology, they never do so with respect to news events. Furthermore, with very rare exceptions, such as the 9/11 attacks, they never publish international media accounts of news events directly on the site.

Despite the CCP hovering over it, the Internet constitutes the most free-wheeling media space in China because the speed and decentralized structure of online communication present an insuperable obstacle to the censors. In Xiao Qiang's words from chapter 9, "When one deals with the blogosphere and the whole Internet with its redundant connections, millions of overlapping clusters, self-organized communities, and new nodes growing in an explosive fashion, total control is nearly impossible." In the short time before a posting can be deleted by a monitor, Netizens circulate it far and wide so it becomes widely known. For example, speeches from foreign leaders, like President Obama's inaugural address, are carefully excerpted on television and in newspapers to cast China in the most positive light. Yet on the Internet you can find the full, unedited version if you are motivated to search for it. There is no longer any hope for authorities to prevent the possibly objectionable statements about China by politicians in Washington, Tokyo, or Taipei, or the cell phone videos and photographs of violent protests in Lhasa or Urumqi, from reaching and arousing reactions from the online public. Once news attracts attention on the Internet, the audience-seeking commercial media are likely to pick it up as well. Xiao Qiang argues that "the rise of online public opinion shows that the CCP and government can no longer maintain absolute control of the mass media and information," and that the result is a "power shift in Chinese society."

HOW ARE THE COMMERCIAL MEDIA AND INTERNET CHANGING CHINESE POLITICS?

Like all politicians, Chinese leaders are concerned first and foremost about their own survival. A rival leader could try to oust them. A mass protest movement could rise up and overthrow them, especially if a rival leader

reaches out beyond the inner circle to lead such a movement. If leaders lose the support of the military, the combination of an elite split and an opposition movement could defeat them. The trauma of 1989 came close to doing just that. Thousands of Chinese students demonstrated in Beijing's Tiananmen Square and over 130 other cities, and CCP leaders disagreed on how to handle the demonstrations. The CCP's rule might have ended had the military refused to obey leader Deng Xiaoping's order to use lethal force to disperse the demonstrators. In that same year, democracy activists brought down the Berlin Wall, and communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe began to crumble. No wonder that since 1989, China's leaders have worried that their own days in power are numbered.

Because commercial journalism was still in its infancy and the Internet had not yet been built, the mass media played a more minor role in the 1989 crisis than it has since then. During the crisis, students, frustrated by what they considered the biased slant of the official press, spread the word about their movement by giving interviews to the foreign press and sending faxes abroad. One market-oriented publication, the *World Economic Herald*, based in Shanghai, faced down Jiang Zemin, then the party secretary of the city, and published uncensored reports. The restive journalists at the *People's Daily* and other official papers, with the blessing of some liberal-minded officials in the Propaganda Department, reported freely on the student movement for a few days in May. The Communist Party leaders were almost as worried about the journalists' rebellion as they were about the students' one.³⁷ After the crackdown, party conservatives closed down several liberal newspapers including the *World Economic Herald* and blamed the crisis in part on the loosening controls over the press that had been introduced by former leaders Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang.³⁸

Since Tiananmen, Chinese leaders have paid close attention to the destabilizing potential of the media. The formula for political survival that they adopted, based on their 1989 experience, focuses on three key tasks:³⁹

- Prevent large-scale social unrest
- Avoid public leadership splits
- Keep the military loyal to the CCP

The three dicta are interconnected: if the leadership group remains cohesive despite the competition that inevitably arises within it, then the CCP and the security police can keep social unrest from spreading out of control

and the government will survive. Unless people receive some signal of permission from the top, protests will be suppressed or fizzle out before they grow politically threatening. But if the divisions among the top leaders come into the open as they did in 1989, people will take to the streets with little fear of punishment. Moreover, were the military leadership to split or abandon the CCP, the entire regime could collapse.

Though commercialization of the media and growth of the Internet have consequences across all three dimensions, today their effects are felt primarily in the efforts to prevent large-scale social unrest. As the chapters in this book describe, the media and Internet are changing the strategic interactions between leaders and the public as the leaders struggle to head off unrest and maintain popular support.

WATCHDOG JOURNALISM: HOW TO REACT WHEN THE DOG BARKS

As noted earlier, the politicians at the top of the CCP are of two minds about whether the media and Internet prevent or encourage large-scale social unrest. On the positive side, the media and Internet provide information on problems so that national leaders can address them before they cause crises. But on the negative side, the market-oriented media and Internet have the subversive effect of facilitating collective action that could turn against CCP rule.

The elite's extreme nervousness about potential protests makes them highly responsive when the media report on a problem. The pressure to react is much greater than it was in the prereform era when the elite relied entirely on confidential internal reporting within the bureaucracy to learn about problems on the ground. Once the media publicize an issue and the issue becomes common knowledge, then the government does not dare ignore it.

Chinese journalists take particular pride in exposés that actually lead to improved governance and changes in policy. One of the earliest and best examples was the reporting about the 2003 death in detention of Sun Zhigang, a young college graduate who had migrated to Guangdong from his native Hubei Province. Qian Gang and David Bandurski, as well as Benjamin Liebman, describe in chapters 2 and 7 how the initial newspaper story published by the *Southern Metropolis Daily*, a bold Guangdong commercial newspaper, circulated

throughout the country on the major news Web sites and transformed Sun's death into a cause célèbre that sparked an emotional outpouring online. This emotional outpouring in turn inspired a group of law students to take the issue of the detention and repatriation of migrants directly to the National People's Congress. Only two months after the first article, Premier Wen Jiabao signed a State Council order abolishing the practice of detaining migrants who did not carry a special identification card and shipping them back to their homes.

Although such instances of actual change in policy are rare, public apologies by high-level officials in response to media criticism are becoming more common. In 2001, Premier Zhu Rongji became the first PRC leader to apologize to the public for a cover-up when he took responsibility for an explosion that killed forty-seven children and staff in a rural school where the students were manufacturing fireworks. Premier Zhu initially had endorsed the far-fetched explanation offered by the local officials of a deranged suicide bomber. But when, despite a blackout of the Chinese media, the accounts of Hong Kong and foreign journalists who had interviewed villagers by telephone spread in China over the Internet, Premier Zhu offered his apology in a televised press conference.⁴⁰

Premier Wen Jiabao has followed the example of his predecessor. He apologized for the melamine-tainted milk and infant formula that killed six and sickened hundreds of thousands of babies. The massive food safety story was originally suppressed by propaganda authorities in the lead-up to the 2008 Olympics, but the scandal was broken by the local press in Gansu Province and the official Xinhua News Service following the games. Premier Wen also apologized for the crippling snowstorms in January 2008 that stranded millions of Chinese eager to get home for the Spring Festival break.

To deflect blame and show how responsive it is to media revelations of official negligence or malfeasance, the central government also has sacked the senior officials implicated in such scandals. The number of such high-profile firings or resignations has increased over the past decade with the growth of investigative journalism. Several good examples are described in this book.

Increasingly, officials at all levels are making a conspicuous show of their receptiveness to online public opinion. They publicize their chats with Netizens. Government agencies have opened up Web sites for citizens' petitions. Law enforcement officers have started inviting Netizens to provide infor-

mation for their criminal investigations. In one case, a creative local propaganda official who was a former Xinhua reporter invited a number of bloggers to join a commission investigating the suspicious death of a prisoner. The bloggers had ridiculed as implausible the police's explanation that the prisoner had walked into the cell wall during a blindman's bluff game among the prisoners; they thought police brutality must be the explanation. The debate died down after the commission released a report that said they knew too little to conclude what had happened and the provincial prosecutors announced the prisoner had not died during a game but had been beaten by another prisoner. The official proudly explained that he had defused the issue by showing that "public opinion on the Internet must be solved by means of the Internet."⁴¹

MONITORING LOCAL OFFICIALS

Every government needs information about how its officials are performing their jobs in order to effectively implement its policies. The top officials of China's thirty-three provinces are appointed by the CCP central leaders in Beijing. Yet the central leaders are continually frustrated by their inability to get regional officials to follow their orders. In a rapidly growing market economy, the old top-down bureaucratic methods of monitoring local officials are no longer working. Local officials benefit more by colluding with local businesses to promote economic growth by spending on big development projects than by providing such social goods as environmental protection, health care, education, and quality food and medicine that are mandated but not fully funded by the central government. Corruption at the local level is rampant. Yet the poor provision of social goods by corrupt local officials could heighten public resentment against the government and threaten CCP rule on the national level.

Theoretically, there are several ways that Beijing could resolve the dilemma of how to oversee the performance of local officials. It could allow citizens to elect their own local leaders. It also could permit independent NGOs to monitor the performance of local leaders. A fully autonomous court system in which prosecutors put corrupt officials on trial and citizens sue for the benefits being denied them also would help. But CCP leaders have been too afraid of losing control to undertake such fundamental institutional reforms. They have chosen instead to rely on the mass media to serve as a fire alarm to alert

the center to problems at lower levels.⁴² From their perspective, using the media looks like a less dangerous approach because they still license media outlets and appoint most of their top editors, thereby retaining some power to rein in errant outlets. Media revelations of local malfeasance also benefit the center by deflecting blame for problems away from themselves and onto local officials. The publicity appears to be working; surveys indicate that Chinese people are more critical of the performance of local officials than of central ones, in contrast to the pattern in American politics.

The center's interest in using the media to monitor local officials has been evident since the mid-1990s. CCTV, with the encouragement of the powerful propaganda czar Ding Guangen (see chapter 2), created a daily program called *Focus* (*Jiaodian Fantan*) to investigate issues at lower levels in 1994. Miao Di, in chapter 4, discusses *Focus* in some detail. The program was blessed with high-level political support, having been visited by three Chinese premiers and praised by China's cabinet, the State Council. The show attracted a wide viewership and strengthened the credibility of television news overall. However, because local officials intervened so frequently to block exposés of their misdeeds, the show now has become much less hard-hitting.

The central authorities tolerate greater press openness on the type of problems that, if left unreported and unsolved, might stir up serious popular dissatisfaction—in particular, problems with water and air pollution as well as food and medicine quality. Some national-level environmental officials have become adept at using media events such as, televised hearings on the environmental impact of important projects to mobilize public pressure on lower-level officials to comply with centrally adopted policies that are environmentally conscious. Veteran journalist Zhan Jiang describes the pattern in chapter 5, on environmental reporting: “as a general rule the center has an interest in receiving information that reduces the information gap between the center and localities regarding potentially volatile problems resulting from negligence by local officials.” However, as he illustrates with the case of the Songhua River chemical spill once journalists pull the fire alarm and alert Beijing and the public to a crisis, then the center tries to reassert control over the media to cool off public emotions and convey an image of a competent government that is solving the problem.

Recently, the central official media have been given the green light to pull the alarm on abuses by local officials. For years, reports have been circulating in the foreign human rights community and the international press about provincial and municipal governments that detain local citizens who have

come to Beijing to petition central officials about their grievances with local officials. They lock up the petitioners in illegal detention centers (“black jails”) on the outskirts of Beijing, ostensibly for “legal education,” and then ship them back home. In November 2009, the official magazine *Outlook* (*Liaowang*) broke the story of these illegal jails and the report appeared on the Xinhua Web site.⁴³

Not surprisingly, local officials are wary of media watchdogs and do what they can to fence them out. As Tsinghua University journalism professor Li Xiguang has noted, “The central government, in the fight against the widespread corruption of the local government, encourages journalists to write exposes of the corruption. But the local governments are very much protective of themselves and of their power, so there is a conflict between the central government and the local government in dealing with journalists.”⁴⁴ Censorship by provincial and local branches of the CCP Propaganda Department and the State Council Information Office is viewed by journalists as tighter than that at the national level. The essays in this book offer numerous examples of local governments’ blackouts of critical news stories and the strategies journalists and activists use to evade them.

Ever since the 1990s, regional commercial newspapers have been doing investigative reporting of corruption and other abuses on the part of local officials, but only outside their own home provinces. This practice is called cross-regional reporting (*yidi jiandu*). Since all local newspapers are part of media groups belonging to the local government and CCP establishment, editors naturally are inhibited from biting the hand that feeds them. Exciting stories about the sins of other people’s officials may be second best but are better than nothing. Reporters are willing to brave police harassment or violent attacks by paid thugs to get the goods on bad governance by officials in other places. Often they don’t have to go to the scene to report the story. As Ben Liebman describes in chapter 7, journalists blocked by local bans from writing about local malfeasance can simply e-mail the information to colleagues from other regions who then write the exposé.

Complaints from provincial and municipal officials about nosy reporters pushed the CCP Propaganda Department to ban the practice of cross-regional reporting in 2004. Because the order was largely ignored, a year later provincial leaders raised the issue again, this time at the level of the Politburo.⁴⁵ Provincial leaders are a powerful group within the CCP, constituting the largest bloc in the Central Committee and one-quarter of the Politburo.

The interests of these leaders incline them to favor tighter restrictions on investigative journalism. As a result of their complaints, cross-regional reporting has been restricted to stories about officials at the county level or below. Only national-level media dare to publish exposés of provincial and municipal officials, and even then they usually wait until they get wind of an official investigation before reporting on the case.

Meanwhile, local officials are learning the art of spin; they hold press conferences and online chats with Netizens to present an appearance of openness and candor—for example, Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai invited television cameras to broadcast live his negotiations with striking taxi drivers in 2009.

The expansion of Internet access and the growth of the Web also make it increasingly difficult for local officials to enforce media blackouts on sensitive issues. Several chapters in this book discuss the 2007 case of the Xiamen PX chemical plant, a project ultimately defeated by the mobilization of environmentally conscious public opinion that breached a local media blockade. As Xiao Qiang tells the story (chapter 9), the outcome resulted from the “gap in control between local authorities as well as between local and central authorities [that] can provide a space for Netizens to transmit information. . . . One of the most vocal advocates for the issue was the blogger Lian Yue, whose Weblog was not hosted within Fujian Province. Because officials outside Fujian, including the central government, did not share the local government’s interest in censoring news about the PX plant, Lian Yue was able to continue his Weblog and even get coverage in newspapers published outside Fujian.”

MEDIA CREDIBILITY AND GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY

Competition from the commercial media and the Web-based media has created what Qian Gang and David Bandurski call a credibility gap problem for the official media. In chapter 2, they compare the ways stories are covered in various kinds of newspapers, vividly illustrating that commercial newspapers’ reporting is far more informative and reliable than that found in official newspapers. Readers are abandoning the official media, and their preference is heightened during crises that arouse their interest and motivate them to search for reliable information.

Daniela Stockmann, in chapter 8, provides new data about how people in China choose between different types of news sources. They use the official press to get information on the government’s current policy position, but turn to the commercial media and the Internet for credible “real news.” As she explains, it is “the perceived disassociation from the government that lends credibility to the nonofficial media.” Stockmann happened to be doing a survey on media usage in Beijing in spring 2005 when student protests against Japan erupted. This serendipity gave her the rare opportunity to compare the way people use the media during normal times and during a crisis. What she discovered was that during a crisis, people have a particularly keen nose for where to find credible information. Even when the propaganda authorities ban reporting of protests and try to homogenize coverage in all types of media, people are more likely to abandon official sources and turn to the commercial press and the Internet than during normal times.

The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic in China in 2003 is referred to by several authors as a turning point in the relations between the government, the media, and the public. By ordering the media to play down early reports of people falling ill with a mysterious disease, a cover-up that allowed the virus to spread and kill more people, Beijing deepened public skepticism about the reliability of the official media and of the government itself. More important, the cover-up taught the public to look to new sources for the true facts. The searing SARS experience also spurred the determination of journalists to meet people’s need for accurate information during a crisis.

The flight from official sources creates a serious problem for Chinese leaders, who need to prevent panic and antigovernment reactions during crises. Leaders plausibly worry that a widespread environmental or food safety catastrophe that angers large numbers of people about the same issue at the same time could snowball into a revolt against the CCP.

Competition from the commercial media and the Web and the narrowing of the information gap between officials and the public forces the government to be more transparent to maintain its credibility. The State Council Information Office and Tsinghua University have trained hundreds of official spokespeople for central, provincial, and municipal government agencies to give press briefings. The central government launched an E-government initiative, and almost every government agency (including very sensitive ones like the Ministry of State Security) now posts information on its Web site.

The trend toward government transparency got a major boost from the Regulations on Open Government Information that went into effect in 2008. The regulations require officials to release information during disasters and emergencies and permit citizens to request the release of government information. An activist took advantage of the opening to request budgets from government agencies. When in October 2009 Guangzhou released departmental budgets and Shanghai refused to do so on the grounds that this information constituted state secrets, the media and online public went wild criticizing Shanghai's excuse.⁴⁶ Xinhua piled on by reprinting many of the critiques, including a hard-hitting advocacy of transparency by *China Youth*. "It is a worldwide custom for governments to have their budgets as open information to the public. This is also a common sense for democratic governance."⁴⁷ A Guangzhou newspaper had been the first to break the story, taking pleasure in highlighting how its hometown was showing up Shanghai.⁴⁸ A few days later, Shanghai succumbed to the tidal wave of censure and announced that it would release the budgetary information.

Another major move toward transparency is happening within China's Xinhua News Service. Traditionally the mouthpiece of the central CCP Propaganda Department, Xinhua has undergone a remarkable makeover and emerged as a more or less genuine news organization that competes avidly with the commercial media and has begun to earn the respect of the journalistic profession. The new Xinhua breaks important stories like the melamine-tainted baby formula scandal and, as of 2008, has a green light from the CCP to report mass protests. During the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, Xinhua reported casualty statistics minute by minute. Media reputations are hard to change, however. The public and the international media still doubt the accuracy of the accounting of the dead reported by Xinhua and the government. Activists like performance artist Ai Weiwei have shamed the CCP and dramatized the people's right to know by collecting and seeking to publish the names of children who died in the earthquake because of shoddy school construction. Huang Qi and Tan Zuoren, who published their investigations of the earthquake victims online, were convicted of revealing state secrets and subversion and sent to jail for long terms.

CCTV has been slower than Xinhua to get the message about credibility. Educated city dwellers are contemptuous of central television for its political docility and the poor quality of its programming. The official television organization made itself a laughingstock in February 2009 when its recently built skyscraper was destroyed in a massive fire ignited by the

company's own Chinese New Year fireworks display. The CCTV evening news show buried the story of its own fire and headlined the fires occurring in Australia instead; in the meantime, cell phone photos and videos of the flaming building taken by people standing on the sidewalk were circulating all over the country. In the aftermath, the head of CCTV was sacked and a new team of executives brought in to remake the organization as a credible news source.

In chapter 7, Benjamin Liebman provides an interesting analysis of the way the Chinese courts are responding to the new media environment by what he calls a kind of "controlled transparency." To defend the integrity of the legal system from the pressures created by media frenzies and online lynch mobs, some legal reformers have called for the courts to provide more information about their cases. Yet by and large, judges have reacted by moving in the opposite direction. Particularly at the local level, "judges argue that controls on media coverage of the courts are necessary to prevent biased coverage that subverts courts' authority."

It took intervention by top leader Hu Jintao in June 2008 to lift the ban against media reporting of mass protests, a giant step toward transparency that many observers believed would never happen because the CCP would not want to send any signal that might encourage copycat protests. This breakthrough is a testament to the importance the central leaders place on maintaining the credibility of the CCP and the government for their own political survival.

The successful experiment with information transparency during the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake may have emboldened leaders to free up reporting of protests, too. On 20 June 2008 Hu paid a well-publicized visit to *People's Daily* to honor the newspaper on its sixtieth anniversary, chat online with Netizens, and give a speech that emphasized the importance of the government "taking the initiative" in shaping public opinion by allowing the state media like Xinhua, CCTV, and *People's Daily* to report breaking news: "We must perfect our system of news release, and improve our system for news reports on sudden-breaking public events, releasing authoritative information at the earliest moment, raising timeliness, increasing transparency, and firmly grasping the initiative in news propaganda work. In the struggle that followed the recent earthquake disaster, we quickly released information about the disaster and the relief effort . . . earning high praise from cadres and the people, and also earning the esteem of the international community."⁴⁹

Just a week after Hu's speech, the first "mass incident," as the Chinese call protests, was reported in the official media. In Weng'an county, a remote region of Guizhou Province in China's southwest, tens of thousands of angry people demonstrated over the drowning death of a young woman. The police had called the death a suicide, but the relatives and friends of the victim claimed it actually was a rape-murder by well-connected local youths. The dramatic images of protesters burning the police station spread instantaneously across the Internet, and the story appeared shortly thereafter on the Xinhua News Service. A year later, when local protests over the suspicious death of a hotel waiter in Shishou City, Hubei Province, were not reported in the media for five days, a commentary in the online version of *People's Daily* drew the contrast with Weng'an. It quoted the Guizhou CCP secretary's statement, "Our commitment to information transparency was the most important reason for the swift settlement of the incident," and drew the conclusion that "information transparency helps enhance the government's credibility."⁵⁰

LISTENING (TOO CLOSELY?) TO PUBLIC OPINION

China's insecure leaders pay close attention to the commercial media and the Internet and treat it as a reflection of what the public actually is thinking. Lacking elections or scientific polls about public attitudes to inform them about citizen views, Chinese politicians in the past had to rely on internal reports generated by their bureaucratic hierarchies. However, nowadays they can read citizens' views on the Internet in raw, unfiltered form. They also can follow trends in public opinion from articles in tabloid newspapers and magazines that sound far more genuine than the hackneyed accounts they used to read in the official press. All media, including Xinhua, pepper their stories with online quotes from Netizens as a way of enhancing their journalistic credibility. Of course the new practice of planting positive online commentary will make it harder for government officials to draw accurate inferences about public opinion from online opinion. Whether government officials and Internet readers will discount positive comments as false and give credence only to the critical ones remains unclear. Each time the government swamps the Internet with pro-government postings, as it did during the Google controversy, it might alienate more people than it wins over. The popular blogger Han Han notes that by packing chat rooms

with paid pro-government commentary, the authorities discourage genuine praise for the government, because no one wants to be thought of as a member of the Fifty-Cent Army.⁵¹

Chinese officials know full well that the public opinion expressed on the Internet is not representative of the population as a whole.⁵² In China as elsewhere, the people who speak out on the Internet are those with extreme points of view. Individuals with more moderate views are less eager to publicize them. Posting one's opinions online carries some danger that one will be flagged by the CCP as a potential troublemaker, so people concerned about their own careers are cautious about making their views known. A 2009 article in the official media argued that it is a mistake to draw inferences about public opinion from the Internet: "online public opinion simply cannot be equated with the opinion of society. The online community cannot stand in for the public, and Internet society cannot replace public society. After all, those able to get online and express their opinion are still a special segment of the people."⁵³ Yet it may be logical for politicians in authoritarian countries to pay attention to the more extreme views articulated on the Internet. Democratic politicians rely on public opinion polls with scientifically selected representative samples because they need to know what the average voter thinks in order to win elections. But politicians in China do not worry about winning elections. Their survival depends instead on being attentive to the people who feel so strongly about an issue that they might come out on the streets to protest. The individuals who fulminate on the Internet are the ones more likely to take the greater risk of participating in, or organizing, mass protests. No wonder that, as Qian Gang and David Bandurski write in chapter 2, "despite the fact that the media remain formally part of the party-government apparatus, CCP leaders are beginning to treat the media and Internet as the voice of the public and respond to it accordingly."

Two of the essays in this book highlight the dangers when China's jittery politicians become excessively attentive to public opinion as they hear it through the media and the Internet. In chapter 10, I describe how nationalist public opinion blows back on the foreign policy process. It has become impossible for the Chinese government to shield the public from news about Japan, Taiwan, and the United States that might enflame nationalist passions. The media compete for audiences by publishing exciting stories that appeal to these passions. Based on the information they get from the commercial media and the Internet, Chinese foreign policymakers form the

impression that nationalist views are intensifying and spreading. I explain that Chinese leaders' fear of a nationalist movement that unites various groups in opposition to a government perceived as too weak in the face of foreign pressure has historical resonance: "Mass movements that accused leaders of failing to defend the nation against foreign aggression brought down the Qing Dynasty in 1911 and the Republic of China in 1949. China's current leaders make foreign policy with a close eye to nationalist criticism of government foreign policy in the media and on the Internet because they are intent on avoiding a similar fate."

Chinese leaders' hyperresponsiveness to popular nationalism sometimes causes them to box themselves into a corner from which it is difficult to escape. After Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi started paying annual visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine where Japanese World War II veterans, including some convicted war criminals, are memorialized, the media and Internet backlash forced China's leaders to freeze all high-level diplomatic contacts with Japan for five years. As I say, another risk of media blowback is that it can "send policy dangerously off track during a crisis when the leaders' perception of an outraged public may drive them to make public threats that they feel they cannot back down from without losing their own popular support." I cite as an example China's conflicts with Europe and the United States over Tibet and the Dalai Lama following the 2008 crisis in which the public erupted in anger after viewing photos and videos of violent attacks on Han Chinese in Lhasa.

Media stories about criminal justice cases, similar to stories about hot-button foreign policy issues, also arouse intense public interest and emotion. Criminal justice, like foreign policy, is a domain in which China's leaders are hyperresponsive, to the extent that they often allow popular emotions to swamp professional judgment in determining outcomes.

In recent years, China has been swept by a craze of Internet-based vigilantism called "human flesh search engine," whereby Netizens investigate and harass individuals, often officials, whom they believe are guilty of an illegal or immoral act, or have been caught in the act by means of a cell phone photograph or video. These online true crime dramas, which often involve exposing local cover-ups, captivate millions of people throughout the country; the stories jump from the Internet to television and print tabloids and back again, churning up a tidal wave of public pressure on the authorities.

According to Benjamin Liebman, in many cases "the media are an important check on official abuses, coming to the assistance of victims of injustice, or pressuring courts to act fairly." But in other cases, "media coverage encourages CCP officials to intervene in the courts, predetermining the outcome of cases and reaffirming CCP oversight of the judiciary." Chapter 7 provides a number of examples in which the commercial media and people on the Internet mobilize, as he puts it, "populist demands for justice—or vengeance," which drive CCP politicians to order judges to impose harsher sentences on defendants and then claim credit for being responsive to the public's calls for justice. Such political interventions not only have questionable effects for procedural justice but also subvert the establishment of an independent judiciary. The courts, in turn, retaliate against media critics by means of defamation suits. Liebman raises the possibility that the CCP may actually benefit from this institutional design in which the courts and the media compete with one another, and the CCP keeps both from becoming completely independent. That is why, he concludes, "commercialization of the Chinese media will not necessarily lead to media freedom, and why media coverage of the courts will not necessarily improve the fairness of the Chinese legal system."

MEDIA COVERAGE OF LEADERSHIP POLITICS

Changes in China's media also make it more difficult for China's leaders to prevent the public from knowing about any differences among them selves. The lesson they drew from Tiananmen—and of the chaotic Cultural Revolution (1966–1969)—was that CCP rule can unravel once people outside the Politburo learn about the splits among top politicians. But in such a radically transformed information environment, how can they keep elite politics secret?

The history of press commercialization in China and other countries shows that publications inevitably start to try to satisfy the demand of white-collar elites and the public at large for information about what is going on behind the curtain at the top reaches of power. As early as the mid-seventeenth century, a publication called the *Beijing Gazette* was publishing, despite the objections of the emperor, information about internal debates stolen from the desktops of senior officials or leaked by them.⁵⁴

So far, the leaders of the CCP have been more successful than the emperor at hiding their internal differences from the public. In Mao's China, people had to read between the lines of the formulaic coverage of leaders' activities and rely on the active rumor mill to figure out who stood where, who was ascendant, and who was in decline among the CCP leadership.⁵⁵ Not much has changed on this front. Reporting on leadership politics or internal deliberations remains taboo. To preserve the facade of unanimity and prevent any leader from reaching beyond the inner circle to mobilize ordinary people, all information about discussions in government and CCP meetings is blacked out.

Leaks of internal deliberations are remarkably rare considering the competition that inevitably occurs within any political oligarchy like China's. This is even more striking considering the desire of the market-oriented media to scoop their rivals with exciting news. The media provide hardly any glimpses behind the curtain. A Chinese journalist told me in an interview, "Leaks about top-level decision making only go to the *New York Times* because people know the Chinese media can't publish such stories."

One modest step toward transparency is that it is now permissible to report the mere fact that the Politburo held a meeting and to mention a couple of the general topics discussed in the meeting. People also took note when Xinhua reported in June 2009 that the mayor of the important southern coastal city of Shenzhen had been fired for "serious disciplinary violations" (which usually means corruption), although it took five days of official silence before the report appeared.⁵⁶

The journalists who have received the harshest punishments, including lengthy jail terms, are those accused of revealing state secrets by reporting leaks about machinations at the top. Zhao Yan, a Chinese journalist in the Beijing bureau of the *New York Times*, was imprisoned for three years because he was accused of obtaining information from anonymous sources that Jiang Zemin planned to retire from his post as head of the Central Military Commission in September 2004. (According to other Chinese journalists, although the *New York Times* reported the story, Zhao Yan actually had nothing to do with acquiring the information.) Shi Tao, a journalist who sent an e-mail abroad revealing the instructions from the Propaganda Department discussed at a meeting of his newspaper, was sent to jail for ten years.

Yet it is only a matter of time before leaks about elite politics will start to appear first on the Internet and eventually in other media as well. Chinese

journalist Guo Yukuan of CCTV and the magazine *Nanfang Chuang*, in a speech at a media conference in China, paid tribute to famous leakers Mark Felt, the "Deep Throat" source of the Watergate affair, Daniel Ellsberg, who released the Pentagon Papers, and Doctor Wang Xueyuan, who revealed exorbitant medical treatments and falsified medical records in Harbin Hospital Number 2. "If we look around," he said, "almost every influential news report has the shadow of a deep throat behind the scene."⁵⁷ Hong Kong newspapers, just across the border, have relied on leaks and guesswork to report on Beijing leadership politics for decades. How long can it be before such stories begin to appear in China too? To entertain a hypothetical idea, think about how easy it would be nowadays for a leader to reach out to a constituency by posting a manifesto on the Internet or granting a candid interview to the media. Certainly, ambitious politicians have already become skillful in using the media to burnish their public image. During 2010, Chongqing CCP Secretary Bo Xilai gained valuable publicity by prosecuting for corruption and mafia ties a large number of very senior local officials. His decisive actions were widely applauded in online forums, raising speculation that he was campaigning for a Politburo Standing Committee slot in the 2012 succession.

THE MILITARY AND THE MEDIA

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been a key player in Chinese politics since before the founding of the People's Republic in 1949. Today, the PLA has become a formidable professional force with international reach. Nevertheless, China's leaders never forget that in a domestic crisis the military also is the ultimate guarantor of CCP rule. In chapter 6, Tai Ming Cheung describes how CCP leaders are managing to keep the military satisfied and loyal in the new media environment.

The PLA's official media, especially the flagship *Liberation Army Daily*, has been protected from the transformations affecting the civilian media and remains fundamentally unchanged. It continues to operate according to the principle of "propaganda first, profitability second," presenting a "sterilized image" of the PLA to its troops and to the public. The *Liberation Army Daily* enjoys a captive audience of the PLA's 2.5 million soldiers, having successfully resisted the government's effort to end mandatory subscriptions to all military units. The civilian authorities don't dare to use the

media, civilian or military, as a watchdog to monitor the PLA the way they do over local governments. The military media, moreover, push back against proposals to strengthen civilian control by putting the PLA under the government, describing the idea as a plot by "Western hostile forces" to separate the PLA from the CCP.

Many Chinese outside the PLA, especially high school and college-age men, are fascinated by military affairs. This audience is being tapped by commercial magazines, many of which are published by firms in the defense industries. As Cheung observes, "By highlighting the technological advances of U.S., European, and other Asian militaries, these publications have helped to create public support for China's own military spending, which buttresses the lobbying of the defense industry." The double-digit annual increases in official military budgets over the past fifteen years have kept the PLA preoccupied with upgrading its capabilities and invested in the political status quo.

THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW

The chapters in this volume illustrate how the commercialization of the media and growth of the Internet have combined to drastically increase the information available to the Chinese people and narrow the information gap between the government and the public. Politicians have been scrambling to exploit the benefits of this new information environment while reducing the risks of it subverting CCP rule. Different groups within the government undoubtedly give different weights to the benefits and risks, with economic officials favoring greater openness, and CCP propaganda officials having a reflexive preference for control. As a result, China's media policies are an inconsistent amalgam of improved transparency and responsiveness on the one hand and huge investments in more effective censorship on the other. The big question is whether these policies are gaining the CCP greater support or generating resistance that could have revolutionary consequences in the future. The information explosion has raised people's expectations about how much information they are entitled to receive. Access to news about popular culture, science and technology, and sports through the world is wide open. The CCP itself, in its speeches and regulations like the one on open government information, has recognized the legitimate right of the public to obtain information. Why then

should people be deprived of knowledge about events happening in their own city or in the nation's capital?

Censorship of newspapers, magazines, and television is largely invisible, but censorship over the Internet is obvious. The very visible hand of the censor is intended to intimidate users with the omnipresent authority of the CCP; cartoon figures pop up to remind users that the eyes of the party are watching what they read and write online. But when users see a piece of news or a critical viewpoint suddenly disappear, followed by a flood of pro-government postings, as occurred during the Google facedown, it reveals the weakness of the regime, not its strength; users know just what kinds of innocuous information the CCP is afraid to allow to become common knowledge.

In chapter 9, Xiao Qiang argues that resentment against censorship is brewing: "The government's pervasive and intrusive censorship system has generated resentment among Chinese Netizens, inspiring new forms of social resistance and demands for greater freedom of information and expression." Netizens ridicule the CCP censors through clever jokes and spoof videos. This covert resistance subverts the moral authority of the CCP. What's more, as such resistance becomes common knowledge it raises the likelihood of outright opposition in the future. A cover-up that leads to massive harm or a hardening of controls over the media or the Internet during a crisis might spark such opposition. The rallying cry of the next Chinese revolution could be "the people's right to know."

Notes

1. China had a genuinely free press for a few days in May 1989, during the Tiananmen demonstrations. See Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, *The Tiananmen Papers* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001). After the crackdown, party conservatives closed down several liberal newspapers—*Shijie Jingji Daobao* (*World Economic Herald*) in Shanghai and *Jingji Xue Zhoukan* (*Economics Weekly*) in Beijing. They also criticized former leaders Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang for making the mistake of loosening control over the press. See Liu Xiaobo, "The Tragedy of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang," Chinese Newsnet.com, March 2005, www.chinesenewsnet.com/MainNews/Opinion/2005_2_19_11_58_68.html.

2. "Internet" refers to the network infrastructure, and "Web" refers to the World Wide Web, the major way of accessing information on the Internet.

3. China Internet Network Information Center, *25th Statistical Report on the Development of China's Internet*, January 2010, <http://www.cnnic.net.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2010/1/15/101600.pdf>.
4. Freedom House, "Freedom of the Press 2009: Table of Global Press Freedom Rankings," http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop/2009/FreedomofthePress2009_tables.pdf (accessed 23 August 2009).
5. Freedom House, "Freedom on the Net: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media," http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/specialreports/NetFreedom2009/FOTN_Charts&Graphs.pdf (accessed 23 August 2009).
6. On 12 January 2010, Google's official statement was posted on its blog, <http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html>.
7. Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Remarks on Internet Freedom," The Newseum, 21 January 2010, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm>.
8. A *Nature* magazine survey of Chinese scientists found that over 92 percent used Google as their primary search engine. *Nature*, 24 February 2010, http://www.nature.com/nature/newspdf/google_china_survey.pdf.
9. For an example of the official Chinese counterattack, see Jiao Xiang, "Google, Don't Become a Tool of Hegemony," *People's Daily Online*, 27 January 2010, translated by the China Media Project, <http://cmp.hku.hk/2010/02/03/4453/>.
10. He Qinglian, *Media Control in China* (Human Rights in China, 2003).
11. Bruce Bueno DeMesquita and George W. Downs, "Development and Democracy," *Foreign Affairs*, September–October 2005.
12. Since 2009, Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube have been blocked to Chinese Netizens. Blocking is used when the Chinese engineers have not yet invented a method for filtering the material, such as online videos.
13. Michael Suk-Young Chwe, *Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 7.
14. Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 144.
15. "The Microphone Era," *Renmin Ribao Online*, 24 June 2009, Open Source Center, CPP20090625710023.
16. Evgeny Morozov, "The Digital Dictatorship," *Wall Street Journal*, 20–21 February 2010.
17. Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Communication in Totalitarian Societies," in *Handbook of Communication*, ed. Ithiel de Sola Pool et al. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), p. 462.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 488.
19. Benjamin L. Liebman, "Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in China's Legal System," *Columbia Law Review*, 105, no. 1, 2005, p. 17.
20. A Beijing taxi driver, when discussing the communist regime in North Korea in 2006, said that the situation there was identical to Mao's China: "The people are ignorant. They only know what their leader tells them. If he says that some other country is bad, then they really hate that country. They have no other way of getting information."
21. Pool, "Communication in Totalitarian Societies."
22. William E. Griffith, "Communist Esoteric Communications: Explication de Texte," in *Handbook of Communication*, ed. Ithiel de Sola Pool et al. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971), pp. 512–520.
23. Pool, "Communication in Totalitarian Societies," p. 463.

24. Wang Guoying, "Annual Report of Newspapers in China 2005," *People's Daily Online*, 5 August 2005, <http://www.media.people.com.cn/GB/40710/40715/3595542.html>; and Yu Guoming, "Summary of China Media Industry Annual Report 2004–2005," 30 June 2005, <http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/chuanmei/903486.htm>.
25. Xinhua News Service, 1 July 2004.
26. An article in *Southern Weekend* on the territorial dispute with Japan over the Diaoyutai Islands by military scholar Cheng Yawen, is a good example of the more pragmatic approach to foreign policy typically adopted by publications in southern China. Cheng Yawen, "Return of Diaoyu Islands Is a Long Way to Go, China Should Be Patient," *Southern Weekend* (Nanfang Zhoumo), 24 February 2005.
27. Sitting at lunch one day with journalists from *Xinmin Evening News*, Shanghai's leading evening tabloid, and *Wen Hui Bao*, a national CCP paper based on Shanghai, I saw why. The *Wen Hui Bao* journalists said they knew their paper was dying and they hoped that it could convert to a commercially viable paper. Unfortunately, they didn't have a clue as to how to successfully commercialize. The *Xinmin Evening News* reporters said that whenever an issue was sensitive (*mingang*), the papers would just publish the Xinhua version of the story. They were proud that their paper had been first in Shanghai to report the news of the inadvertent American bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1999. Their paper "played the issue much cooler than the northern [Beijing] press."
28. *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), Internet version, 10 July 2003.
29. "Interview: International Editor of the Year Hu Shuli," *World Press Review*, 50, no. 10 (October 2003).
30. China Daily.com, 2 March 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-03/02/content_9522102.htm. On protests by journalists, also see Jonathan Hassid, "China's Contentious Journalists: Reconceptualizing the Media," *Problems of Post-Communism*, 55, no. 4 (July–August 2008), pp. 52–61.
31. Evan Osnos, "The Forbidden Zone," *The New Yorker*, 20 July 2009, p. 55.
32. Li Weijiao and Rao Zhi, "Hubei Governor Li Hongzhong Grabs Female Reporter's Recorder," *Caijing*, 8 March 2010, <http://www.caijing.com.cn/2010-03-08/110391938.html> (article removed, now redirects to Caijing homepage). Text of the article can be found at Legal News Net, <http://www.fzkx.net/NewsExpress/hot/201003/20100309115535.html>; Taihu Pearl Net 太湖明珠网, <http://news.thmz.com/col36/2010/03/2010-03-10717266.html>; Tianya Forum <http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/free/1/1828455.shtml> (accessed 23 May 2010).
33. Some Netizen activists have actually proposed the formation of a Netizens political party. See John Kennedy, "China: Netizen Party Announced," <http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2008/02/09/china-netizen-party-announced/>.
34. Yongnian Zheng and Guoguang Wu, "Information Technology, Public Space, and Collective Action in China," *Comparative Political Studies*, 38, no. 5 (June 2005), pp. 507–536, presents 2002–2004 survey data indicating that by far the highest priority use of Chinese Internet users is to read news.
35. Chinese bloggers are the best source of reporting on the practice, which was introduced in 2004 in Hunan Province and has spread widely since then. See China Digital Times, "Chinese Bloggers on the History and Influence of the 'Fifty Cent Party,'" <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/05/chinese-bloggers-on-the-history-and-influence-of-the-fifty-cent-party/>.

36. Reported in *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), 1 August 2009, http://www.dwnnews.com/gb/MainNews/Forums/BackStage/2009_7_31_16_2_33_171.html (accessed 19 August 2009).
37. Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, *The Tiananmen Papers* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).
38. Liu Xiaobo, "The Tragedy of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang," Chinese Newsnet.com, March 2005, www.chinesenewsnet.com/MainNews/Opinion/2005_2_1_19_11_58_68.html.
39. I make this argument in my book *China: Fragile Superpower* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
40. "Premier Zhu Rongji Meets the Press," 15 March 2001, http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/26/content_17166.htm (accessed 21 May 2010).
41. *Financial Times*, 18 July 2009.
42. The concepts of "police patrols" and "fire alarms" as methods by which principals monitor agents was first suggested by Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms," *American Journal of Political Science*, 1984, pp. 165–179.
43. The Xinhua article, http://news.xinhuanet.com/lian Zheng/2009-11/24/content_12533816.htm (accessed 8 December 2009), is no longer on the Xinhua site. The original *Liaowang* article on the black jails can be found at <http://club.kdnet.net/newbbs/dispbbs.asp?boardid=76&id=3129734> (accessed 22 May 2010), and articles about it can be found on the other main news portals <http://news.163.com/09/1126/00/5P0NIHH0000120GR.html>; <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2009-11-25/035019119578.shtml>; <http://news.sohu.com/20091125/n268443257.shtml> (accessed 22 May 2010).
44. National Public Radio, *On the Media*, 17 March 2006.
45. Propaganda officials from seventeen provinces and metropolitan areas sent a joint petition to the CCP Central Committee in September 2005 demanding the ending of cross-regional media supervision. As a result the CCP General Office issued a directive halting it. Zhao Yuezhī, *Communication in China: Political Economy, Power and Conflict* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), pp. 43–44; Jingrong Tong and Colin Sparks, "Investigative Journalism in China Today," *Journalism Studies*, 10, no. 3 (2009), p. 341.
46. Searches on 31 October 2009 for "Shanghai Bureau of Finance claims that budgets are state secrets so cannot be publicized," on Baidu turned up 5,200 separate results and on Google turned up 62,200 results.
47. *Zhongguo Qingnian*, 27 October 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2009-10/27/content_12335534.htm (accessed 31 October 2009).
48. *Yangcheng Wanbao*, 24 October 2009, http://www.ycwb.com/ePaper/ycwb/html/2009-10/24/content_631236.htm (accessed 31 October 2009).
49. Quoted by David Bandurski, China Media Project, <http://cmp.hku.hk/2008/06/25/1079/>. Bandurski has labeled this new, more active approach to the CCP's control of the media Control 2.0. For a full translation of Hu's speech, see CPP20080621701001 Beijing *Renmin Ribao Online*, in Chinese, 21 June 2008.
50. Open Source Center, CPP20090625710023 Beijing *Renmin Ribao Online*, in Chinese, 24 June 2009, p. 5.
51. Translated by chinaSMACK, 9 February 2010, http://www.chinasmack.com/bloggers/han-han-fifty-cent-party-must-work-overtime/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=shortlink&utm_campaign=shortlinks.

52. Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower*, pp. 102–103.
53. *Jiefangjun Ribao* [People's Liberation Army Daily], 10 March 2009, Open Source Center CPP20090311710007.
54. Personal communication from the late Frederick Wakeman.
55. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the struggle between Mao and other leaders came out into the open in official newspaper and magazine commentaries, and unofficial Red Guard publications appeared.
56. "Shenzhen Mayor Removed from Post for 'Serious Disciplinary Violations,'" *Xinhua Net*, 11 June 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-06/11/content_11526098.htm (accessed 20 August 2009).
57. See Guo Yukuan, "Paying Respect to Deep Throat," http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20060323_1.htm (accessed August 21, 2009).